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virginia Tort Reform: A Case of Crying Wolf?
By
Michael F. McAu1iffe*

Introduction
The

current

ever-increasing

debate

cries

of

on

tort

blame

from

reform
all

has

resu1 ted

participants.

factions become entangled in a battle of emotion,
misrepresentation,

the

discussion

of

in

As

the

semantics and

affordable,

available

liability insurance seems neglected at best, cast aside at worst.
While

several

thoughtful

have

studies

emerged, 1

the

relationship between liability insurance and tort reform is often
tenuously

connected

by

anecdotal

recitals

that

lack depth

sUbstance. 2 A systematic approach is needed to provide a
for

rational

debate

and

evaluation.

This

article

and

forum

proposes

a

framework for the analysis of the recent tort reform action taken
by the

1987 Virginia General Assemb1y.3 The article,

reform

legislation

as

a

guide,

evaluates

the

using the

relevant

tort

variaJ;>les within th,e proposed framework. The article concludes by
* Mr. McAuliffe is a 1st year law student
of Law, College of William and Mary and a
the National Center for state Courts. The
Professor Paul LeBel and Dr. Robert Roper
ideas relevant to this article.

at Marshall-Wythe School
Research Associate at
author wishes to thank
for their assistance and

1 The Liability Crisis: Hearings Before The Subcommittee on
Economic Stabilization of The Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress,
Second Session, Serial 99-98. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1986. Parts I and II. (hereinafter Hearings).
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our AllegedlY
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4 (1983).
Roper, The propensity to Litigate in state Trial Courts, 19811985, 1984-1985, 11 Just. Sys. J. ___ (1987).
A Call For Insurance Reform and Meaningful Insurance Regulation:
Breaking the Cash-flow Underwriting cycle To Restore Equity In The
Insurance Marketplace, submitted to the West Virginia Legislature
by West Virginia Attorney General Charles Brown (1987)
(hereinafter Brown Report) .
2 See The Lawsuit Crisis, Insurance Information Institute, New
York, April 1986; Sorry your Policy is Cancelled, Time, March 2,
1986; Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1986 at 1, col.l.; Sky high
Damage Suits, U.s. News and World Report, January 27, 1986 at 35.
3 The Legislation includes: 1987 Va. Acts SB402,
1987 Va. Acts SB404, 1987 Va. Acts SB405, 1987 Va. Acts SB407,
1987 Va. Acts SB408, 1987 Va. Acts SB409, 1987 Va. Acts SB665,
1987 Va. Acts HB1216, 1987 Va. Acts HB1315, 1987 Va. Acts SB618,
1987 Va. Acts HB1234, 1987 Va. Acts HB1235.
4

suggesting appropriate future action concerning tort reform and
the insurance crisis in Virginia.

Framework for Discussion: A Two-Part Analysis
No established structure exists in which tort reform and its
relationship to the present insurance situation can be uniformly
addressed.

The

discussion

is

too often

framed

in conclusions.

Popular periodical articles unquestioningly assume a

litigation

explosion is occurring. 4 A recent Justice Department Tort Policy
Report

confidently

filings

have

implication,

concludes

increased
state

758

filings

that

federal

product

percent

from

1974-1985

have

also

increased

liability
and,

by

significantly. 5

This is despite the fact that 95-97 percent of all tort cases are
filed in the state court system. 6
The

conclusory methods

of

many

in

regard

to

the

complex

insurance liability crisis cloud the discussion of critical causal
variables. The relevant variables encompass both insurance related
and tort related issues.
the

level

awards,

of
(3)

The tort related variables include

litigation,

(2)

the

sUbstantive

tort

size

law

and

and

frequency

of

court

(4)

(1)
tort

review

mechanisms. These variables are not meant to be exhaustive,
represent

a

correlates

limited
of

the

set

of

visible

insurance

factors

liability

commonly

crisis. 7

but

used

The

as

proper

framework for the discussion of tort reform consists of a two-part
analysis. The tort variables should be (1) addressed in principle
and

(2)

subsequently

variables
links

the

purported
should

be

in

principle

variables
net

quantified.

effect

examined

focuses

to
of
in

the
the

The

discussion

on the

logical

insurance

tort variables,

addition

to

the

tort

foundation

that

Further,

the

crisis.

of

insurance

measuring

the

losses,

variables

themselves as part of the quantification discussion.
4 See supra, note 2.
5 Tort Policy Working Group, Report of the Tort Policy Working
Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current
crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability, 45 (1986)
(hereinafter Tort Policy Working Group Report). The report simply
asserts, "There is no reason to believe that the state courts have
not witnessed a similar dramatic increase in the number of product
liability claims."
6 Roper, State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual Report 1984,
5

A

systematic

method

of

evaluating

tort

reform

variables

enables the analysis to remain focused. Thus, the methodology of
this article provides the framework to discuss the relationship of
the tort variables to the present liability insurance crisis and
then examine their impact on the liability "landscape."
The Known "Crisis"
That an insurance rate crisis exists throughout the nation is
not

disputed.

In

Virginia,

rates

in

medical malpractice and day care)
percent

increases

obstetrics,
policies

in

Virginia

premiums
insurers

altogether. 9

The

areas

several

manufacturing)

and

(including

have experienced 100 to 300+
in

at

the

past

one

most

years. 8

two

point

stopped

affected

insurance crisis are medical malpractice,
care,

lines

by

writing

the

current

small businesses

corporate directors

In

(day

and officers.

The

lack of affordable, available liability insurance has rocked the
foundation

predictability

of

Virginia

that

businesses,

municipalities and professionals rely on to operate.

The self-

evident truth is that liability insurance is an economic necessity
and the lack of that necessity has provided the catalyst for a
quick-fix

approach.

Nationally, the liability premium situation is much the same
as in Virginia.

Rates have risen drastically in many liability

lines since 1984. 10 In west Virginia,

five leading insurers,

one

over

sweep,

cancelled

insureds .11 Notably,
rate

crisis

availability
business

during
was

cycles

coverage

for

6,500

health

Virginia and the nation endured a
1975-1977

restricted. 12
have

when

rates

Seven

emerged

to

that

rose
ten

and
year

possess

in

care

similar
coverage

insurance
the

same

National Center for State Courts (1986).
7 Tort Policy Working Group Report, s~pra note 5, at 34.
8 virginia Attorney General's Submiss~on, Joint Subcommittee
studying the Liability Insurance Crisis and the Need For Tort
Reform, Senate Document No. 11 Richmond, virginia: The
Commonwealth of Virginia (1987) at Appendix D (Hereinafter Senate
Document No. 11).
9 The companies were st. Paul's and the Virginia Insurance
Reciprocal. Id. at 13.
10 For example, premiums for corporate directors and officers
rose 50 to 500 percent in 1985 nationally. Tort Policy Working
Group Report, iupra note 5, at 6.
II The West V rginia Attorney General subsequently filed suit in
federal court seeking an injunction prohibiting the insurers from
cancelling their policies. Brown Report, supra note 1, at 21.
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characteristics

at

the

bottom

of

each

cycle:

liability

rates

dramatically increasing, availability of liability coverage being
severely restricted,
change. 13

The

cry

frequent policy cancellations and a cry for

for

change

in

1985-87

has

been

answered

by

well-intentioned but erroneous legislation: tort reform.
The 1987 General Assembly
Virginia joined the majority of state legislatures in 1987
in

passing

recurring

legislation

liability

aimed

insurance

at

alleviating

crisis.

The

the

new tort

extreme

and

legislation

includes 14
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

8.
9.

Senate Bill eSB) 402: A cap on punitive damages at
$350,000.
SB 404: Liability limit~tions for corporate
officers and directors.
SB 405: Modifies the statute of limitations for minors
who suffer birth injuries.
SB 407: Sanctions against the filing of frivolous
claims or pleadings.
SB 408: Liability protection for persons who
are involved in emergency obstetrical care when
the mother's medical records are unavailable and
the personnel did not supervise prenatal care.
SB 409: Limited liability immunity for members of local
government entities.
SB 665: Compensation fund for victims suffering
injuries from vaccinations. Payment from the fund
precludes tort recovery from the doctor and/or
manufacturer.
House Bill eHB) 1216: A special recovery fund for
children who suffer brain or spinal injuries during
birth. The fund precludes recovery through the courts.
HB 1315: Allows cities, towns or other political
subdivisions to provide its employees and volunteers
including local governments, commissions, boards and
agencies with liability insurance coverage.

The session also produced three significant insurance measures.
1.
2.

3.

The

SB 618: A fund to provide medical malpractice insurance
when it is otherwise unavailable is restructured to
lower rates for participating doctors.
HB 1234: A yearly filing requirement that details the
type of payment (claim, settlement) and how much loss
reserve is set aside by each insurer. Modeled after
current medical malpractice reporting.
HB 1235: Requires at least 45 day notice of policy
cancellations, reductions or significant rate
increases. Also allows Bureau of Insurance to consider
investment income in the determination of unfair rates.

1986 General Assembly appointed a

joint subcommittee to

study the liability crisis and the need for tort reform,

and to

report its findings to the 1987 General Assembly. The newly passed
12 Senate Document No. 11, supra note 9, at 5.
13 Id.
14 Bill references were found in Summary of the Regular 1987
Legislative Session of the virginia General Assembly, prepared by
7

tort legislation is,

in part, a reflection of the subcommittee's

recommendations. 15 Virginia Attorney General Mary Sue Terry also
submitted recommended legislation that focused on the problems of
the

state's

legislation
General's

insurance

relevant
position

to

scheme. 16

regulatory
insurance

that

the

reform

reveals

insurance

The

enacted

the

Attorney

is

largely

industry

responsible for the present insurance crisis.
The tort reform legislation passed by the General Assembly
also

reflects

accompanies

the

tort

intense

reform.

political

As

a

maneuvering

example,

SB

402,

that
the

often

punitive

damages cap bill, started in the Senate as a cap on damages for
"pain and suffering"

(a form of non-economic damages). The House

responded by changing the bill to punitive damages and forced a
last minute compromise. 17
The change to a punitive damages cap was a victory for tort
reform opponents because they viewed the cap on pain and suffering
to be more intrusive to the rights of injured victims. However,
the result of such distinct special interest lobbying is that the
debate is missing the basic cooperation that is needed to find
real causes and effective solutions to the liability crisis.
Despite the factional nature of the participants, the clear
goal of .the lawmakers in enacting the reforms was to reduce and
stabilize

insurance

availability.

The

rates

and

Virginia

to

increase

legislation

liability

reveals

a

policy

well-worn

emphasis on altering legal mechanisms and limiting court access in
tort recovery to accomplish those goals.

Senate Bills 404,

405,

407, 408, 409, 665, and House Bill 1216 all attempt to limit the
"input"

(disputes)

of the

legal

system.

Simultaneously,

Senate

Bill 402 limits the "output" (damages) of the legal system.
The

Virginia

decreased

use

of

legislation
the

legal

liability insurance crisis.
the

answer

to

the

passed

system

in

will

the
help

belief

that

"solve"

the

The assumption that tort reform is

insurance

the Division of Legislative
15 Senate Document No. 11,
16 Senate Document No. 11,
Office submission.
17 Insurance Damage Limits

was

crisis

persists

in

the

minds

Service (1987).
supra, note 9.
supra note 9 at Attorney General's
Clear House, Times-Herald,
8

of

lawmakers and the public. 18 If incorrect, these pervasive views
on the tort system will misdirect much of the reform "mentality"
that exists and will result in Virginia and the nation repeating
the present insurance crisis experience.

The Framework Applied to Tort Reform
The Validity of the Variables
Placed under scrutiny, the selected tort variables provide a
basic

picture

of

how

the

tort

system

in

reality

affects

the

present liability insurance crisis. Tort reform advocates assert
that (1) the increase in the level of litigation and (2) the lack
of realistic damage assessment (specifically, the standards used
in

non-economic

concert

to

Additionally,
of

jury

and

remove

punitive

damage

stability

in

determinations)

the

rate-making

act

in

process. 19

reform advocates claim that the size and frequency

awards

result

in

high

claim

eliminating insurance profitability.
make the financial

(loss)

payments,

Both ass.:!rtions

thus

combine to

state of the insurers the nexus between the

tort system and the insurance crisis, thus the discussion in this
article reflects that emphasis.
The Level of Litigation
Numerous articles confidently conclude that the frequency of
tort claims

is a

primary source of the current high

rates. 20 Although
cost

structure

the

of

the

level

of tort

insurance

insurance

litigation may affect the

industry

(ultimately

seen

in

policy rates), the reverse conclusion, that because there are high
insurance
litigation,

rates
does

then
not

there

are

follow.

necessarily
Simply,

one

high
cannot

levels
state

of
a

February 27, 1987 at B4, col. 1.
18 See Lawpoll, A.B.A. J. Vol. 73 at 37 (1987): Public Attitudes
Toward The Civil Justice System And Tort Law Reform, Survey by
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. for Aetna. Note, the results of
the poll are somewhat inconsistent. For example, the poll
indicates that a majority of respondents thought the present tort
system is fair to both plaintiff and defendant. At the same time,
the poll also indicated that the majority of respondents thought
that plaintiffs were recovering excessive awards and the tort
system needed reform.
19 Tort Policy Working Group Report, supra note 5, at 30.
20 See supra note 2: Hearings, supra note 1, at 144 (testimony of
Richard Willard, Assistant u.S. Attorney General).
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conclusion

and

claim that

the

conclusion

alone

justifies

the

premise.
The
levels

relationship

is

between

inherently more

insurance

complex.

rates

Indeed,

and

a

litigation

given

level

of

litigation does not translate into a given level of claim payouts
(that would depend on individual dispute outcomes). Even if more
claims are being litigated, plaintiffs might be losing. Further,
even

if the level of litigation is increasing,

the qualitative

judgement that the increase is unwarranted is speculative at best.
The assumption that the recovery rate of ten or twenty years ago
is the optimum level of litigation is an unsupported fallacy of
opinion.
A recent research study of long-term civil filings in Arizona
suggests that civil

filings

are

cyclical

and

tied

to

economic

conditions. 21 The implication of such findings is that the level
of litigation itself is not an accurate measure of the general
incentive

to

litigate,

but may reflect

outside the control of the tort system.

other

external

For example,

factors

landlord-

tenant disputes might increase because landlords may have to seek
enforced
conditions

remedies
would

(e.g.
not

back

be

as

rent)

that

necessary

in

because

better
of

economic

replacement

tenants.
In addition,

the majority of disputes

generally and specifically with tort claims)

(in civil litigation
never reach formal

litigation. 22 A significant portion of claims are settled with
alternative dispute resolution methods. 23 Thus,
levels

change,

a

corresponding

occur with settlements.

change

(inverse

while litigation
or direct)

may

The relationship between litigation and

alternative dispute resolution is presently unclear, but any link
21 Stookey, Economic Cycles and Civil Litigation,
11 Just. Sys. J.
(1987).
22 90-95 percent-of all disputes are resolved before trial.
Trends in Million Dollar Verdicts, A.B.A. J. Vol. 70 at 54
(1984) .
23 63 percent of civil cases are settled, and less than 10
percent are tried through verdict. Kritzer. The Lawyer as
Negotiator: working in the Shadows, Paper presented at the
Conference on Frontiers of Research on Civil Litigation, Institute
of Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin Law SI::hool,
September 20, 1985 at 12. (cited in Assault on Personal Injury
Lawsuits: A Study of Reality versus Myths, Public Citizen, (1986)
(hereinafter Public Citizen Report).
10

severely

limits

explosion"

the

theoretical

accuracy

of

the

"litigation

argument as evidence of severe insurance losses.

However, a sustained and dramatic increase in the number of
tort cases could conceiveably act as a rough indicator of a system
out

of

balance.

The

next

question,

given

some

"conceivable"

relationship between the level of litigation and insurance loss
payments,

is whether the nation's courts are suffering the burden

of increased filings.
The body of evidence is growing that shows no significant,
disproportionate increases
for

state Courts'

(NCSC)

in tort filings.

The National

study of civil tort

filings

center

for

1978

through 1984 reveals a 9 percent increase in tort filings matched
with an 8 percent increase in population. 24 In the 1985 update of
the tort filings study, the National center for state Courts found
an irregular checkerboard pattern. The study concludes:
Although, the same patterns exist among the states,
i.e. some are experiencing increases, some
decreases, and others no significant changes, the
general downward trend appears to have abated •. tort
filings did not increase at all in New Jersey's
general jurisdiction courts; increased between 1 and
4 percent in four other state courts; increased 5-8
percent in the general jurisdiction courts of five
states; rose by at least 10 percent in five states;
but were down in another five statewide general
jurisdiction courts. 25
Importantly,

no

comprehensive
findings. 26

study

data

Notably,

of

has

national
surfaced

scope

that

uses

contradicting

relatively
the

NCSC's

Virginia Supreme Court Chief Justice Harry

Carrico recently testified before Congress:
There is a widely held belief that our society is becoming
ever more litigious, that we are far too willing to sue
for damages and punitive awards. We have not experienced
this explosion in virginia ••• A new study by the National
Center for State Courts has informed us .•• that we are not
all that different (from the rest of the nation).27
24 A Preliminary Examination of Available Civil and Criminal
Trend Data in state Trial Courts for 1978, 1981 and 1984, National
Center for State Courts, (1986).
25Roper, supra note 1, at ___ .
26 See, Peterson, Civil Juries in the 1980's, Trends in Jury
Trials and Verdicts in California and Cook County, Illinois,
Rand Institute of civil Justice (1987). The Rand study, though
limited to San Francisco and Cook counties, revealed significant
differences in litigation levels between the two sites. The
results fail to quantify any consistent litigation trend and
explicitly note the median jury awards in both sites are not
indicative of an award explosion.
27 Statement of the Conference of Chief Justices on Amendments to
S.1999 and S.100 before the Consumer Subcommittee Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate, May 20, 1986.
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The

objective

determination

that

no

tort

litigation

"explosion" exists in the nation's courts seems beyond serious
contention. However, the perception of an increase in the level of
litigation persists, in part due to the media coverage of the tort
reform

debate

and

an

easily

identifiable

culprit

system) .28

Some have

correctly asserted that tort

eventually

increase,

not

because

the media. 29

of

because
The

of

the

tort

(the

legal

filings may

variables,

image of large verdicts

but

and high

levels of litigation may become a media induced, self-fulfilling
prophecy.

The

risk

is

present

that

the

media

will

provide

unjustified reinforcement for the current attitudes of a failing
tort system and ill-founded and misplaced reform will result.
Jury Awards
Possibly

more

relevant

to

insural1ce

industry

financial

performance than general litigation level data is the size and
frequency of jury awards broken down by specific types of cases.
Tort reform advocates argue that the tort system unnecessarily
allows

excessive

jury

punitive damages).
that plaintiffs
over-recovery.

awards

(specifically,

non-economic

and

The foundation of the pro-reform argument is

lj:-

The

;ate because of the built-in probability of
result

is

that

insurers

incur

excessive

payments which in_,lrn fuels the liability insurance crisis.
The

primary

tort

law

indicators

relevant

to

Virginia's

legislation are non-economic and punitive damages. In principle,
the concept of non-economic damages is in accordance with accepted
notions of
based

on

just compensation.
adequate

proof,

the

However,

if

probability

jury awards are not
of

excessive

awards

increases. This concern is the rationale for legislative caps on
damage awards
twenty-five

similar to Virginia's SB 402.

states

had

enacted

some

type

As of
of

late

damage

1986,

award

limitation. 30
28 Roper, supra note 1, at
29 Id. at
30 Figure is compiled from the following sources: National
Conference of State Legislatures, summary Report of 1986
Legislative Action_on Liability Insurance, (1986);
Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks
on Medical Malpractice Laws, 38 Okla. L. Rev. 195 (1985); Klein.
Caps in the Hat: Legislative Lids on Runaway Verdicts, 28 For The
Def. 19 (1986). Note, damage award caps have been the subject of
12

The subjective nature of non-economic damages, however, does
not translate into a flawed tort system. Jury awards are subject
to the review of the court through remittitur and the appellate
process.

Notably,

the most

common

"war stories"

reform advocates concern excessive awards.

cited by tort

The same cases also

represent the most appropriate examples of a

system capable of

itself. 31

correcting

Punitive damages have similar inherently subjective standards.
unlike

However,

non-economic

damages,

fashioned to punish the defendant
wi th

unacceptable

damages

are

for actions deemed committed

Virginia

intent.

punitive

courts

use

malice

or

recklessness with conscious disregard of others as the standard of
conduct. 32
the

As

with

appropriateness

necessary.
the

Thus,

current

non-economic
of

damages,

punitive

the quantifiable

court mechanisms,

the

the

court can

damages

and

question

is whether,

frequency

review

intervene

and

size

when

despite
of

non-

economic and punitive awards are significantly affecting insurance
performance.
The

sources

of

data

most

commonly

cited

concerning

jury

awards lack the depth and methodology of the litigation studies.
The major organization currently used by both sides in the tort
debate

is

Jury Verdict Research,

Inc.

(JVR). 33

The

manner

in

which the data is packaged seems to dictate which side uses the
(JVR)

verdict

information.

Tort

"average" award in tort cases

reform advocates

point to the

(specifically medical malpractice)

to show a whole system gone wild.
For example, the Justice Department Tort Policy Working Group
Report points

to an

average medical

malpractice

jury award of

$666,123 in 1984. 34 However, the median award is a more suitable
figure to indicate a "representative" award because the presence
of

extremely

large

awards

will

skew

the

average

jury

award.

recent constitutional litigation. Recently, Boyd v. Bulala,
647 F. Supp. 781 (W.O. Va. 1986), invalidated the current medical
malpractice award cap of 1 million dollars on federal
constitutional grounds. The state plans to appeal the case.
31Roper, supr~ note 1, at ___ •
32 Giant of V1rginia v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679.
33 See Jury Verdict Research, Inc. Injury Valuation: Current
Award Trends, No. 304 (1986) (cited in Tort Policy Working Group
Report, supra note 5, at 35-45).
13

Importantly,

JVR

applicable

figure

awards. 35

The

expressly
when

median

notes

discussing

medical

$200,000. 36 Generally,

that

median

awards

are

jury

"representative"

malpractice

award

for

when median awards are used,

the

1984

was

no dramatic

increase in the size of awards is shown for any tort case type. 37
However, the data used and methodology employed by JVR limits
its use. For example, only successful recoveries are computed into
the statistical award figures published by JVR, when all verdicts
should
Also,

be
only

included

to

original

accurately

verdicts

reflect

are

significant portion of verdicts

jury

included

are

in

reduced,

determinations.
the

figures.

A

rendering verdict

figures inaccurate when used in the context of measuring insurance
payouts. A recent study tracking the final payout of the million
dollar verdicts reported by JVR,

reports the total value of the

verdict awards was reduced by 57 percent. 38 The study also showed
that higher verdict amounts experienced the largest reductions and
most

the

recovery. 39
control,

seriously
These

injured

relationships

but to a

received
point

not

the
to

a

largest
system

court system capable of rational

net

out

of

review and

adjustment.
The fundamental problems with JVR verdict figures limit their
utility in the tort reform debate and provide the incentive for
alternative sources of

information to be developed.

One recent

study of civil jury verdicts in 43 counties in 10 states concluded
(1)

verdicts fell into fairly defined moderate ranges and (2) no

significant
exists

in

nationally

pattern
the

of

short-term

sampled courts. 40

representative,

but

increases

The
does

in

verdict

awards

study is not meant to be
provide

the

most

useful

34 Tort Policy Working Group Report, supra note 5, at 35-36.
35 Hearings, supra note 1, at 171 (testimony of Philip J. Herman,
Jury Verdict Research, Inc.).
36 See, supra note 23, at 19.
37 Id. at 18-19.
38 Broder, Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards: Jury
Verdicts and Final Disbursements, 11 Just. Sys. J. ___ (1987).
39 Id. at
•
40 Daniels and Martin, Jury Verdicts and the "Crisis" in civil
Justice: Some Findings from an Empirical Study,
11 Just. Sys. J. ___ (1987). The study states, "The interquartile
ranges are also modest for most sites. The 75th percentile is
below $100,000 in 26 sites, and the interquartile range itself
(from the 25th to 75th percentile) is less than $100,000 in almost
two-thirds (28) of the sites, indicating that most awards fall
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methodology and data on jury awards to date and should provide the
basis for subsequent work.
Another

recent

study,

limited

concluded that the evidence
punitive
study

damages

indicates

by

the

punitive

damages,

has

indicates extremely limited use of
courts. 4l

nation's

punitive

to

damages

were

specifically,

awarded

in

less

the

than

2

percent of sampled product liability cases in 1984-1985. 42
When

award

figures

are properly

scrutinized,

the

findings

suggest that (1) the jury system is not awarding excessive damages
and (2) when large awards are given, the present court mechanisms
often reduce the amounts substantially.
Insurance Industry Financial Performance
The tort variables are only relevant to the insurance crisis
to

the

extent

that

they

affect

insurance

industry

finanical

performance. Therefore, if the industry is financially sound, the
causal "impact" of the tort variables would be minimal.

One can

argue that despite a hypothetically high level of litigation and
high

jury

awards,

if

the

industry

is profitable,

the

need

to

dramatically increase liability premiums would still be missing.
The evidence concerning insurance industry performance is a
central point of disagreement between tort reform advocates and
tort system
advocate)

supporters.

uses

The

statutory

insurance

accounting

industry

methods

to

(a

tort

show

reform

financial

performance, while others (insurance reform advocates, tort system
supporters, and most industries other than the insurance industry)
use

Generally Accepted Accounting

financial

Principles

(GAAP)

to measure

performance.

The weight of recent scholarly literature suggests GAAP more
realistically

reflects

the

operating

performance

and

financial

state of the insurance industry. 43 Using the Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles method,

the industry has experienced a net

gain of $83 billion dollars over the last ten years. 44 Further,
within a well-defined and relatively narrow range."
41 Landes and Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages,
10 Reg. 33 (1986).
42 Id. at 36.
43 Brown Report, supra note I, at 6.
44 Hearings, supra note I, at 4 (prepared statement of William
Anderson, General Government Division, united states General
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the value of insurance industry stock doubled in 1985. 45 Indeed,
the industry, in its worst year, 1984, reported a profit. 46
In virginia, the industry has, on average, lower payout rates
than the rest of the nation and recently has experienced a
percent

annual

rate

reform measures,

of

return. 47

Appropriately,

HB 1314 and 1315,

allow

the

37

insurance

(but do not require)

state regulators to look at the industry's performance in Virginia
(including investment income)

when determining if Virginia rates

are excessive.
industry

insurance

The

is

not

suffering

from

deep,

permanent organizational financial losses. While certain lines of
insurance

coverage

may

be

experiencing

losses,

indicates that the insurance industry as a

the

evidence

whole is performing

profitably and in relative ignorance of the "runaway tort system"
given the role of wolf.
Virginia's Response to the Variables
The

Virginia

General

insurance crisis is a
fleeting

attempt

at

Assembly's

response

to

the

current

legislative package of tort reform and a
insurance

rate

oversight.

The

continuing

adherence to quick, almost reflexive actions exemplifies the lack
of depth taken by many lawmakers when confronted with insurance
industry cries of abuse and instability.
subcommittee report concludes that

(1)

being

a

excessively

awarded,

(2)

exists in Virginia for insurers,
present

in

Virginia

and

(4)

findings,

the

(3)

For example,

the joint

punitive damages are not
stable

loss

environment

no litigation "explosion" is
the

insurance

industry

is

profitable. 48
Despite

these

report

recommends

tort

reform

legislation to achieve a "balance" of interests between consumers,
insurers and inj ured persons. 49 However, the interests that tort
reform

addresses

(e.g.

injured

persons'

recoveries,

insurance

Accounting Office).
45 Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (testimony 'of J. Robert Hunter,
National Insurance Consumer Organization).
46 Id. at attachment II (General Accounting Office statement).
47 senate Document No. 11, supra note 9, at Appendix C (and
insurance performance report of the Virginia Attorney General's
Office consultant).
48 Senate Document No. 11, supra note 8, at 8-10.
49 Id. at 11.
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losses through recovery payments and loss predictions based on
levels of litigation) are the very issues identified in the report
as being "in balance." The only relevant variable not "in balance"
is the insurance rates presently forced on consumers.
The current Virginia tort legislation fails,

not because the

lawmakers' goal of reducing insurance rates is inappropriate, but
because

the

focus
Given

misplaced.
explosion,

no

industry,

the

unwarranted

on

accomplishing

the

serious

empirical
award

in

the

rate

evidence

abuse

and

context

of

of

a

attention

continuing

and,

the

reduction

litigation

no

profitable
'tort

on

finding

is

insurance

reform

solutions

to

is
the

liability insurance crisis, simply wrong.
Alternative Variables
The level of tort litigation and size of damage awards are but
two of

a

set of

factors that potentially affect the

financial

performance of the insurance industry. with the elimination of the
tort variables as primary causal elements, the insurance oriented
variables

(cash-flow underwriting,

poor risk assessment etc.)

cyclicality of the

industry,

offer a sound alternative explanation

for the present insurance rate crisis.
While

an

in-depth

analysis

is

beyond

the

scope

of

this

article, recent literature 50 suggests that the insurance industry
underpriced and accepted riskier policies during the period of
high interest rates (1981-1983). Using this myopic strategy, the
companies attracted large amounts of investment capital. The high
rates of return on investment income during this period shielded
the industry from any purely premium/payout based losses. Indeed,
the

industry

10sses. 51

In

more

than

addition,

covered
reinsurers

any

incidental

bought

the

premium/payout

riskier

policies

from the primary insurers and the process continued.
Only when interest rates fell
cover

the

decreased

income

in 1984 did insurers have to
from

investments

and

pure

50 Brown Report, supra note 1; Hearings, supra note 1 (testimony
of insurance industry executives and representatives in Part II);
McGee, The Cycle in Property/casualty Insurance, FRBNY Quarterly
Review 22 (Autumn, 1986).
51 Hearings, supra note 1, at 4-6 (of the General Accounting
Office Report).
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premium/payout

losses

with

drastically

increased

premiums.

Simultaneously, reinsurers stopped buying the riskier policies and
the whole market contracted.

Based on the foregoing explanation,

many conclude that the insurance business cycle is the primary
causal agent afflicting the insurance industry.
Conclusion
A

two

part

analysis

of

the

tort

variables

asserts

a

persuasive case for the elimination of the level of litigation and
jury awards as causal elements in the present insurance crisis.
Indeed,

the

national

analysis

litigation

reveals
trends

a

and

tort
to

system operating

a

court

system

with

no

capable

of

self correcting any propensity to award excessive damages.
Any

future

action

concerning Virginia's

insurance

problem

should focus on insurance reform, not tort reform. specifically,
the virginia Board of Insurance should promote stability through
better

analysis

of

the

industry's

financial

performance,

more

control on fluctuations in rates and an authoritative role in the
determination of the rates themselves. 52
Tort reform in Virginia should be separated from the present
liability

insurance

crisis

and

evaluated

using

independent

theories of justification. For example, Virginia might address the
role of contributory negligence and whether it provides adequate
opportunity

just

for

compensation. 53

Another

related

consideration would be whether, under an alternative (comparative)
negligence

scheme,

joint and

several

liability would

remain

a

viable doctrine. virginia tort reform represents ample debatable
issues without the

unnecessary and

unwarranted

linkage

to

the

state's liability insurance crisis.
An independent evaluation of the tort system and concurrent
investigation

of

predetermined

conclusions

liability

insurance

discussion,

and

reform

presently
may

eliminates
hampering

encourage

many
the

reasoned,

of

the

insurance
thoughtful

change in both areas.
52 Senate Document No. 11, supra, note 9, at Attorney General's
Office legislative recommendations.
53 LeBel, contributory Negligence and Mitigation of Damages:
Comparative Negligence Through the Back Door? 10 Va. B. A. J. 11
(1984).
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VIRGINIA • S STA'l'O'l'ORY CAP ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AWARDS:

A Message to the General Assembly to Tighten the Lid
By
Richard T. Pledger*

INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1970's, the American medical community has
experienced greater and greater difficulty securing affordable
malpractice insurance coverage. What began as a bona fide attempt to
extend coverage at reasonable rates has rapidly evolved into an
expensive, high stakes business venture. Doctors at one time paid
nominal premiums to protect themselves from potential yet unlikely
claims. Today, most physicians spend enormous sums just to obtain
minimal coverage. For others, adequate coverage is simply unavailable.
As a result, most health care providers must make the difficult
decision of paying outrageous premiums, practicing without liability
insurance, or leaving the profession altogether. l The alternatives
are unacceptable. In short, there seems to be a malpractice insurance
crisis, at least on a national scale.
Although premiums are rising for a number of bona fide economic
reasons, a much more fundamental and troubling phenomenon is at work.
Malpractice claims currently are adjudicated by a method that permits
damage awards that are grossly disproportionate to actual injuries
incurred. At common law, awards traditionally encompassed the whole
gamut of compensatory and exemplary damages. Moreover, because the
plaintiffs' bar has routinely operated on a thirty-three percent
contingency fee basis, prayers and awards for relief have often been
grossly exaggerated. Although there is some degree of precision in
measuring actual damages, such measurement remains highly subjective.
The ability of claimants to secure disproportionately large settlement
agreements also is enhanced by this process. For these reasons,
insurance carriers must raise their premiums lest they go bankrupt,
leaving truly meritorious claimants uncompensated.
In response to this perceived insurance crisis, many state
legislatures took steps to modify the procedural and substantive
aspects of medical malpractice law. 2 In addition, various changes
were made and implemented in state insurance laws. 3 Some of the
advances have been successfuli 4 others have been struck by subsequent
judicial review on various constitutional grounds. 5

*

Mr. Pledger is a 3d year law student at the Marshall-Wythe School
of Law and Chief Justice of the Moot Court Board.
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VIRGINIA' S S'l'AWl'ORY CAP

The Commonwealth of Virginia has followed the trend of most other
states. The General Assembly enacted the Medical Malpractic Act of
virginia,6 an elaborate statutory scheme providing for medical
malpractice review panels, as well as other sUbstantive and procedural
changes. Aside from some adverse commentary,7 Virginia's prescreening
process has been perceived as largely successful. Much more
controversial, however, has been the statutory cap placed on medical
malpractice awards by section 8.0l-S8l.lS.8
Section 8.0l-S8l.lS provides that n[i]n any verdict returned
against a health care provider in an action for malpractice ••• the
total amount recoverable for any injury to, or death of, a patient
shall not exceed one million dollars. n9 The effect of this provision
is to preclude recovery of all damages, compensatory as well as
exemplary, which exceed one million dollars, regardless of the
severity of the injury.
Like many other states' statutory cap
provisions, the Act's legislative findings were stated in broo.d terms.
However, they were specific enough to echo the general concerns
expressed nationwide during the mid-1970s. 10
Response to the statutory cap was strong and poignant. One
particularly adept article,ll authored by Edward Taylor and William
Shields, thoroughly explores the history of the Act, Virginia's
experience prior to the cap's enactment, and some of the more salient
constitutional questions that the Act posed. The article specifically
asserts that, contrary to the findings of the General Assembly,
n[t]here was no demonstrated need for legislation in 1976 which
limi ted recovery for malpractice. n12 The article urges n [c) ourts [to]
declare the cap violative of the Constitution of .Virginia [and] apply
a 'means focused' test to find it unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. nl3
The concerns
expressed by Taylor and Shields have recently been addressed by two
courts sitting in Virginia.
The first case, Boyd ~ Bulala,14 was decided by Judge Michael of
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia.
In Boyd, the plaintiffs claimed that their child was born with various
mental and physical handicaps as a result of their doctor's
negligence. The jury agreed and returned verdicts for a total of $8.3
million dollars. In its discussion of the constitutionality of the
cap, the court refused to hold that it violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. lS It did hold, however, that the
cap impermissibly infringed the right to a jury trial under both the
seventh amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1,
section 11 of the Virginia Constitution. 16
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In its equal protection analysis, the court found that the cap
"creates neither a suspect classification nor infringes upon a
fundamental right."17 Therefore, because the cap was nothing more
than a classic example of economic regulation, the proper standard of
review was the rational relation or nexus test. lS Under this
standard, legislation is presumed constitutional and will be upheld if
it is rationally related to the legislative objectives.
The court
simply found that "the medical malpractice cap is clearly a rational
means to achieve the legislative goal of securing the provision of
health care services by maintaining insurance at affordable rates."19
Judge Michael then turned to the jury trial issue. The court
recognized that the jury has traditionally performed an important
function in the history and jurisprudence of both the United States
and the Commonwealth of virginia. 20 Part of its role is to serve as a
fact-finding body, and" [s] ince the assessment of damages is a fact
issue committed to the jury for resolution, a limitation on the
performance of that function is a limitation on the role of the
jury."2l Consequently, the cap imposed by section S.01-5Sl.15 was
held to restrict the right to a jury trial, a violation of the seventh
amendement to the United States Constitution. 22 Similarily, in the
courts view, because "article 1, secion 11 of the Virginia
Constitution is ••• equivalent to the feoeral seventh amendment
right," it held that the cap violated the Commonwealth's constitution
as well. 23
The second case, Williams v. Van Der Woude,24 was decided by Judge
Fortkort of the Ninet.eenth Judicial Circuit of Virginia. In Williams,
the plaintiff claimed that the negligence of her ooctor and a local
clinic led to the failure to diagnose and treat her cervical cancer.
The jury agreed and returned a verdict in the amount of three million
dollars. In considering the plaintiff's motion to waive the statutory
cap, the court rejected Judge Michael's jury right and equal
protection analyses in Boyd. Instead, Judge Fortkort declined to rule
on the jury question at all and held that the statutory cap violated
equal prot.ection under the federal constitution.
The circuit court first addressed the argument that the cap
violated the right to a jury trial. Alt.hough the court opined that
the cap "imposes severe limitations on the Constitutional [sic] right
to a jury trial," it expressly refrained from ruling on that point. 25
In a lengthy footnote, Judge Fortkort expressed reservations about the
cap's constitutional invalidity in this regard and noted that "tbe
[United States] Suprenle Court may not conclude that the limitation on
the jury as a fact finder is a violation of the Seventh Amendment."26
Although the court declined to rule on the jury issue, it did
premise its equal protection analysis on the important function of the
jury. The court explicitly found that the right to a jury trial is
accorded greater protection under the Virginia Constitution than unoer
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the federal constitution. nThe Virginia right to a jury trial,n wrote
Judge Fortkort, nis more explicit than the Federal Constitutional
[sic] grant and is a basic· right of our people. Since ••• the right
to a civil jury trial is not deemed a fundamental right under [federal
constitutional] analysis, it is at least an 'important' right [in
Virginia] demanding 'heightened scrutiny,.n27 In support, the court
cited article 1, section 11 of the Virginia Constitution which
provides in part n[t]hat in controversies respecting property and in
suits between man and man, trial by jury is preferable to any other,
and ought to be held sacred. n28
The court's selection of this rational basis with heightened
scrutiny test was based on its interpretation of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center ,29 a recent case decided by the United States Supreme
Court. In Cleburne, a city ordinance that required a special use
permit be acquired prior to the opening of a group home for the
mentally retarded was challenged and declared unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds. Judge Fortkort found that, although nthe
Cleburne decision was badly fragmented n, it created a rational basis
with heightened scrutiny standard which is more deferential than the
intermediate scrutiny standard but less so that the rational basis
test. 30
In addition to finding that the right to a jury trial in Virginia
is an important right worthy of heightened scrutiny, the court also
found that the statutory cap discriminated against a particularly
sensitive class. The cap places a one million dollar limit on all
damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions. Although persons
sustaining one million dollars or less in damages are entitled to full
compensation under the statute, those who incur greater damages are
not. Thus, the sensitive class nis comprised of those persons most
seriously injured by the negligence of medical care providers. 31
In short, the court provides two reasons for adopting a rational
basis with heightened scrutiny stanc1ard. First, the statute removes
from the jury's consideration an assessment of damages above the cap's
limit, a function traditionally assigned to the jury. Under the
Virginia Constitution, the right to a jury trial is sacred and any
curtailment of that right ought to receive heightened scrutiny.
Second, the cap creates two classes amongst those injured by medical
malpractice. One is enti t:l ed to receive full compensation, whereas
the other is not. The dispositive question for the court, then, was
whether the state had articulated legitimate objectives to justify the
cap's enactment.
At this juncture the court considered the
legislative findings articulated in the Act's preamble.
Judge
Fortkort, citing the article by Taylor and Shields,32 found that
n Ie] ontrClry to some representations made at the time the stCltllte was
enrolled, there was no real malpractice insurance crisis in Virginia.
There was no evidence that health care providers were declining to
practice in Virginia due to high premiums. n33 The court further
elaborated on tIle legitimacy of the state's objectives:

"

The number of cases involving the medical
malpractice limitation may be fewer that 10 in the
10 years of its existence. The limitation is
indiscriminate in that it is a general limitation
regardless of the injuries proven. The beneficiary
of the limitation has not been the general public
since the size of the affected group is too small
to have any effect on general insurance premiums.
Plainly stated, the beneficiaries of the
limitation are those who have committed a civil
wrong and the disadvantaged class are those most
severely injured by that wrong. BlockinS full
recovery in these cases by the artificial
limitation ~.fhieves no discernibly legitimate
state goals.The court then summarized that
This legislation forms a small powerless
group with no conceivable benefit to the public at
large except an illusion of action. The function
of the jury trial is altered so that regardless of
the facts produced, the court must reduce the
verdict to a predetermined limitation. A sensitive
class is formed and the important fundamental
right to tr~l by jury is diminished by this
legislation.
Thus, the one million dollar cap imposed by section 8.01-581.15 was
held to violate equal protection because it denied a sensitive class
full compensation for damages incurred due to the negligence of
medical practioners and infringed ul~n the important right to a jury
trial without achieving any legitimate stat.e objectives.

RAMIFICATIONS AND REX:OMMENDATIONS

When construed together, Boyd and Williams highlight some
troubling questions. The first deals with the choice of different
equal protection standards. The second relates to the reasons why
differing standards were selected.
The third concerns the
ramifications of the respective equal protection analyses employed.
In Boyd, the statutory cap was held not to violate equal
protection under the rational basis standard. This test was applied
because the statute "creates neither a suspect classification nor
infringes upon a fundamental right. n36 However, the cap was found to
deny the right to a jury trial, a right the maintenance of which "'is

of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment ••• should be scrutinized
with the utmost care,."37 Apparently, L'nder Boyd, the seventh
amendment right to a jury trial is of such importance--perhaps
fundamentally so -- that any infringement deserves very careful
scrutiny. Yet under the equal protection clause, the very same right
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merits only the most c1eferential revie.... The result is inconsistent.
The court sboulo bave ruled either that neither equal protection nor
the right to a jury t.rial was oenieo, or alt.ernatively, applied a more
rigorous standard of review in its equal protection analysis.
In contrast to Boyd, the same statut(.)ry cap waH fOUfi(l to c1eny
equal protection in Williams under the rational basis with heightened
scrutiny standard. This test waH selected becC'.use the right to a jury
trial and heightened scrutiny standard of Cleburne was deemed
controlling. ~~though the coUrt acknowledged that Cleburne "was badly
fragmented",3B and that its effect "is highly speculative since the
holding remains something of a mystery,n39 it agreed that the rational
basis test was used. 40 Cleburne used that test because "no
fundamental rights were implicated."4l However, Judge Fortkort,
relying on the dissenting portion of an opinion in which Justice
~1arshall concurred in part. and dissenteo in part,42 interpreced the
decision as authorizing a standard less deferential than the test
used. In short, Judge Fortkort read Cleburne as creating a new level
of equal protection review. 43 ~i'hether this interpretation of Cleburne
is correct remains to be seen.
llnder either approach, the results are at the very least partially
disturbing. The use of the Boyd approach allows the imposition of a
one million dollar cap, regardless of injuries incurred, leaving the
most seriously injured partially uncompensated. The use of the
Wiliams approach permits unrestrained judgments with awards grossly
disproportionate to actual injuries incurred.
Whether or not the two equal protection standards were properly
selected, the anaJys~§ in Boyg and Nilliams were correct under the
respective tests. The courts could only assess the rationality and
legitimacy of the statute by referring to the objectives cited in the
Act's legislative history. The real crux of the problem then is the
reason why the General Assembly acted at the time the statute was
enrolled.
The preamble to the Medical Malpractice Act of Virginia provides
that
Whereas, the General Assembly has determined that
it is becoming increaSingly difficult for health
care providers of the Commonwealth to obtain medical
malpractice insurance with limits at affordable
rates in excess of $750,000; and Whereas, the
difficulty, cost and potential unavailability 0f
such insurance has caused heal th care provide;: ci to
cease providing services or to retire prematurely
and has become a SUbstantial impairment to health
care providers entering into practice in the
Commonwealth and reduces or will tend to reduce the
number of young people interested in or willing to
enter health care careers; and
24

Whereas, these factors constitute a significant
problem adversely affecting the public health,
safety and welfare which necessitates the imposition
of a limitation on the liability of health care
providers in tort actions commf.rly referrecl to as
medical malpractice cases • • ."

As evidenced by the language used, the General Assembly's
concerns were general and stated in very broad terms. Yet there is an
appalling lack of evidence which would otherwise support the
Indeed,
imposition of a cap on medical malpractice damages.
subsequent studies based on empirical evidence relating to Virginia's
experience prior to the enactment of the cap demonstrate that there
was no need for such action cap in 1976. 45 In short, the legislature's
actions were premature. The statutory scheme authori.zing a cap on
damages in 1976 was a hasty response to a general nationw ide
perception that a malpractice insurance crisis indeed existed.
The time has come for the General Assembly to complete its
examination of the posture of medical malpractice insurance in the
Commonwealth of Virginia. steps in the right direction have already
been taken. A joint subcommittee is currently reviewing Virginia's
medical malpractice laws and their effects on the adjudication of
malpractice claims. 46 The subcommittee needs to specifically address
how exemplary damages affect the cost and availability of malpractice
insurance in the Commonwealth, and the propriety of only restricting
the amount of noneconomic damages. The current statutory denies full
compenstaton for those who receive actual injury greater than one
million dollars yet permits others who have nominal injuries to earn
windfall profits on exemplary damages. By the same token, the absence
of any limitation will simply encourage awards that are grossly
disproportionate to actual injuries received.
The General Assembly should enact legislaton which amends section
8.01-581.15. A claimant should be entitled to receive full
compensation for all economic damages incurred, but be denied awards
for noneconomic damages that exceed a reasonable amount. A similar
proposal has been endorsed by the Joint Subcommittee Studying the
Liability Insurance Crisis and the Need for Tort Reform. 47 The
proposal suggests a limitation on "the total amount awarded for
noneconomic damages against all defendants found to be liable,·48
including medical practitioners, to "the greater of three times the
amount of damages awarded for economic losses or $250,000.,,49
Although the joint subcommittee's proposal provides otherwise,50
noneconomic damages should include punitive damages as well. Only in
this way will all those injured by medical malpractice be able to
receive full economic recovery. In addition, such an amendment would
curtail grossly disproportionate exemplary awards, an evil that has
contributed to the national medical malpractice insurance crisis.
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Surrogate Parenting Aqreements in Virqinia

Kristina Keech*
Bruce McDougal**

Due to the highly publicized Baby M trial recently decided in
Hoboken, New Jersey,l Americans have been forced to consider the
issues

raised

by

Surrogate

Parenting

arrangements. 2

Cases

testing the validity of such contracts have arisen in at least
five

states,3

only a

but

none

have

been

matter of time before

Virginia

court

interpret

a

brought

such a

surrogate

in

virginia.

case arises.
parenting

It

is

How will

contract,

a

what

legal issues are raised by surrogate parenting contracts, and what
regulations should be put in place to control and manage Surrogate
Parenting Agreements?
Surrogate parenting agreements are primarily used by married
couples who have attempted to bear a child on their own and due to
the woman I s

infertility or genetic disorder are unable or are

afraid to conceive. Approximately seventeen percent of all couples
of

reproductive

age

have

difficulty

becoming

parents. 4

such

couples frequently turn to legally sanctioned adoption to obtain a
child, and are informed that if they pass the standards set up by
the particular adoption agency or board they may have to wait
three

to

seven

characteristics.

years
5

The

to
use

obtain
of

a

a

child

surrogate

with

mother

certain

allows

the

couple to have a child biologically related to the husband in less

* Ms. Keech is a second- year student at Marshall-Wythe.
** Mr. McDougal is a first year student at Marshall-Wythe, and is
the Managing Editor of the Colonial Lawyer.
I Stern v. Whitehead,
N.J.
(1987)
2 A recent poll published in NeWSWeek Magazine showed that 63%
of Americans approved of Surrogate Parenting agreements when the
woman was infertile, 54% approved when a pregnancy would present a
risk to the health of the woman, and only 14% approved when the
woman was able to but was afraid or unwilling to bear a child.
3 Stern v. Whitehead,
N.J.
(1987), In re Adoption of
Baby Girl, L.J., 505 N.Y~2d 813~32 Misc.2d 972 (1986),
Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Com. ex reI. Armstrong
704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986), Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 362 N.W.2d
211, 420 Mich. 367 (1985), Sherwyn & Handel v. California State
Dept of Social Services, 218 Cal.Rptr. 778, 173 Cal.App.3d 52
(1985), Doe v. Kelley, 106" Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981)
4 Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for
Le islation, 44 La. L. Rev. 1641 (1984)
Matter of Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815
(1986)
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than a year.
This note will summarize the technology involved, the moral,
ethical

and

legal

issues

presented,

the

issues

of

which

an

attorney should be aware, and will propose legislative action to
deal with the issues presented by Surrogate Parenting Agreements.
Reproductive Technology
Three major methods of "artificial conception" are in use in
the

united

states

fertilization,
and

used

are

and

today,

artificial

insemination,

embryo

transfer. 6

These

together

to

overcome

in

methods

various

vitro
overlap

reproductive

difficulties.
Artificial

insemination

accepted technology.
impregnated
syringe.

by

is

the

most

common

In artificial insemination

means

of

an

artificial

The sperm used can

be

from

and

(AI)

a woman is

instrument,

any

donor.

widely

usually

a

Sperm can be

"frozen" for extended periods of time. AI is used when the male
of a couple is impotent or has a low sperm count, or when a woman
wants to bear a child without a relationship with a man.
In vitro fertilization occurs when the fertilization takes
place

in

a

laboratory medium outside

growing embryo is then implanted in a

any human body,
woman's womb.

and

the

Since the

joining of the sperm and the ovum is conducted in a laboratory,
they

can

come

from

any

source.

Embryos,

like

sperm,

can

be

frozen. In vitro fertilization is used when a woman has blocked or
damaged fallopian tubes but is capable of carrying a

child to

term.
Embryo

transfer

refers

to

the

relocation of

a

developing

embryo from a laboratory culture medium to a human womb, or from
one

human

womb

to

another.

There

is

no

requirement

that

the

carrying woman be biologically related to the embryo which she
carries to term.
A "Surrogate Mother" is a woman carrying a fetus to term. for
another person or persons who intend to raise the child produced.
The surrogate can get pregnant either by artificial insemination

6 For a more extensive discussion of the various reproductive
technologies than we can afford here, see Wadlington, Artificial
conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 Va. L. Rev. 465
(1983); Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory
for Legislation, 44 La. L. Rev. 1641 (1984); Note, Reproductive
Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 Harv.
L. Rev. 669 (1986).
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with the father's sperm or the embryo can be produced in vitro and
transferred to the surrogate's womb. This means that she mayor
may not have a biological relationship to the child. For purposes
of

this

article,

"surrogate

mother"

will

refer

to

a

woman

carrying a child produced by the joining of her ovum and a man's
sperm

through

artificial

insemination.

She

is

therefore

the

child's biological mother.
Moral, Ethical and Legal Issues
There is no technological limitation to the identity or
relationship of the parties who may employ artificial conception
in order
without

to

reproduce.

the

burdens

A lesbian who
of

a

wishes

relationship

or

to

bear

marriage

a

child

can

be

inseminated with the sperm of a nameless donor. A widow can bear
the child of her long-dead husband. A couple can have a number of
embryos

created

in

the

lab,

bear

one

and

freeze

the

rest.

A

single man who wishes to raise a child could have his baby borne
by a surrogate mother.
Each of these combinations produces it's own moral,

ethical

and legal dilemmas. This note will discuss only the issues raised
by a

surrogate parenting agreement wherein a married couple, of

which the woman is incapable of ovulating and carrying a child,
seeks out and pays a woman to be impregnated through artificial
insemination

with

the

sperm

resulting fetus to term.

of

the

father

and

to

carry

the

She agrees to maintain certain health

standards: not to smoke, drink, use drugs or to abort the fetus.
She will remain under the care of a doctor throughout the term of
her pregnancy.

She agrees to sever her parental rights to the

child and give custody to the father,

and her husband agrees to

sever any claim he may have if she is married. The contracting
couple agree to pay all of the mother's medical and legal expenses
plus a

fee which can be either for her service of carrying the

child or for severing her parental claim. The father's wife will
adopt the child as her own, and the couple agrees that they will
not refuse to take the child.
Surrogate Parenting agreements raise a number of interesting
moral issues:
Surrogacy agreements weaken the venerated bond between
the mother who bears the child and the child and therefore
cheapens "motherhood.,,7
7 However, surrogacy allows an infertile woman the ability to
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Surrogacy
professional

agreements

breeders.

producers of a product,

exploit

Rather

women

than

by

being

making

mothers

chosen for their health,

them

they

are

sturdiness

and genetic make-up.8
Surrogacy agreements will allow continued repression of
the poor by the weal thy.
Parenting

arrangements

Because of the cost

only

the

wealthy

of Surrogate

will

be

able

to

consider it as a solution to infertility and it is likely that
only poor women would consider being a surrogate. 9
The

compelling

human

interest

in

allowing

Surrogate

Parenting as an option to infertile couples isn't present if
busy professional women are allowed to hire other women to
bear their children for them merely so they do not have to
take time out from their careers. lO
Surrogacy agreements treat children as a commodity to be
bought and sold, introducing the spectre of slavery which has
been outlawed in this country.ll
The children born of surrogate mothers are illegitimate,
born

out

of

adultery

between

the

married

father

and

the

surrogate. 12
The
parenting,

Roman

Catholic

Church

believes

that

surrogate

along with all forms of artificial conception,

unacceptable because the only appropriate way to produce

is
a

experience motherhood to a child born of her husband, one step
closer than an adopted child unrelated to either of them.
8 The counter-argument is that it's about time that women were
allowed to profit from their unique ability to bear children:
normal adoption procedures exploit women by prohibiting payment to
the mother who bears the child while everyone else gets paid.
9 In a positive manner, Surrogate Parenting can be viewed as a
new and possibly lucrative field for women. Rather than being
demeaning to bear a child for another woman, it could be viewed as
a noble and honorable profession, and pretty well-paying, too.
10 If the use of surrogates by fertile women is perceived as a
problem, legislation could require a showing of infertility before
being allowed to enter into a Surrogate Parenting Agreement.
11 Adoption procedures normally require the payment of a fee to
the agency and frequently involve the services of an attorney. A
Surrogate Parenting agreement would include a payment to the woman
bearing the child which can be for her services as a womb and not
a payment for the child itself.
12 This is biblically acceptable: Sarah, unable to bear her
husband Abraham a child, directed him to Hagar, her Egyptian
handmaiden. Hagar bore him Ishmael. Genesis 16:1-2, 15. In more
modern times, the Uniform Parentage Act in force in some form in
15 states, legitimates the chidren born to married women by
artificial insemination and protects the anonymity of the sperm
donor. The U.P.A. is in force in unchanged form in: Alabama,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Washington, and wyoming. It is in force in amended form in
Illinois and in substantially similar form in Ohio. Council of
State Governments, The Book of States, 1986-87, 329 (1986).

31

child is naturally by married couples. 13 Any involvement of
medical

experts,

technicians and laboratory workers

further

removes the act of reproduction from the marriage where it
properly belongs, this view holds. Further, the participation
of the surrogate as a third party fornicatress or adulteress
makes

objectionable. 14

more

arrangement

the

Ethical issues for attorneys include a possible conflict of
interest

if they represent both the contracting couple and the

surrogate mother.

If surrogate Parenting Agreements continue to

exist only in the twilight between legality and criminality then
attorneys will be able to charge contracting couples exorbitant
fees and may be tempted to coerce women who have not been informed
of all of the physical and psychological risks they incur to be
surrogate mothers.
Legal
bartering,

include

issues
public

policy

state

prohibitions

issues,

and

a

against

question

of

baby

contract

damages if the contract is to be acknowledged as valid.
Prohibitions against Baby Bartering
A

couple's

arrangement

desire

often

to

have

a

child

through

a

surrogate

is

analyzed as conflicting with states'
prohibitions on baby selling. 15 virginia has no express provision
against baby-bartering, but does have prohibitions against payment
of

fees to physicians,

recommendations

for

attorneys

adoptions .16

or clergy
A bill was

in connection with
introduced

in the

1987 General Assembly which would add "any remunerated assistance
provided to a parent •.. in locating or effecting the placement of

a

child"

activity. 1117

to

the

This

definition

statutory

of

"unauthorized

language

may

be

placement

interpreted

to

preclude payments to professionals in connection with Surrogate
Parenting arrangements.
In Ford v.
custody

Ford the United states Supreme Court held that

contracts

Virginia's

are

SUbstantial

not

binding

interest

in

in

Virginia

preventing

courts
the

due

to

custody

of

13 Text of Vatican's Doctrinal statement on Human Reproduction,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at A14, col. 1.
14 Although not all American Roman Catholics accept all of the
teachings of their church, this view will affect the political
discussion in those areas of the country with large concentrations
of Roman Catholics. virginia is 5.1% Roman Catholic, compared with
a~~roximatelY 25% nationwide.
New York and Kentucky have found that state prohibitions
against baby bartering do not apply to surrogate Parenting
arrangements. Michigan has held that they do. See supra n. 2.
16 Va. Code Ann. § 63.1-204 (c) (1) (Supp. 1986).
17 H.R. 1496, 87 Sess., 1987 Virginia Laws.
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children from being the subject of barter. 18 This indicates that
a

surrogate

Parenting arrangement

which

is

worded so that the

payment seems to be for the custody of the child would be opposed
to stated Virginia policy.
A Virginia court may conclude that the concern with payments
in connection with the custody of children is not applicable to a
Surrogate Parenting Arrangement .19

The

court

could

concur with

the Kentucky court's reasoning in Surrogate Parenting Associates,
Inc.

v.

Kentucky, 20

between the

that

"there

are

fundamental

surrogate parenting procedure .•• and

differences

the

buying and

selling of children as prohibited by the statute. ,,21 Prohibition
of

baby

selling

pressuring
child.

is

parents

with

Surrogate

voluntarily

intended

financial

parenting

entered

to

into

prevent

inducements

arrangements

before

baby-brokers
to

involve

conception.

part
an

from

with

a

agreement

Additionally,

the

payment is made by the natural father of the child, who presumably
will act in the best interest of the child. Thus the evils sought
to be prevented by prohibitions

against baby-bartering are not

present in surrogate Parenting arrangements.
Given the stated policy in virginia against payments to third
parties

for

the

placement

of

children,

a

court would probably

disallow any fees charged in connection with such an arrangement.
The CUstody Dispute
If a court does not recognize the contract, the conflict must
be resolved as a

traditional custody battle.

Even if the court

allows the contract as a custody agreement, in its role as parens
patriae it is free to disregard the contract in determining the
best interest of the child. 22
The

first major hurdle is establishing paternity.

virginia

has adopted a statute that presumes the legitimacy of a child born
through

artificial

husband's

insemination

permission. 23

to

a

married

Only the natural

woman

mother,

with

the child,

the
or

the woman's husband can challenge the existence or non-existence

18 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
19 See Note, The Dilemma of Surrogate Parenthood, 73 Geo. L.J.
l283-cI985)~ Gersz, The contract in surrogate Motherhood: A Review
of the Issues, 12 Law, Med . .& Health Care 107, 109 (1984). But see
Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It? 10 Am. J.L. & Med.
243 (1984).
20 12 Fam. L. Rev. (BNA) 1207 (Ky. Cir. ct. 1986).
21 Id. at 1207.
22 Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
23 Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-257 (D) (1950).
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of the father-child relationship. Thus the biological father does
not even have standing to challenge the paternity of the child.
Thus the surrogate must be single or the surrogate must have
already given up the child to the father for the father to bring a
paternity

action.

This

goes

against

the

recommendations

of

attorneys involved in Surrogate Parenting arrangemens who prefer
to use married women who have borne children before to ensure that
they are able to bear children and that they will be emotionally
more stable and therefore able to give up the children.
This

result

indicates

the

inapplicability

of

Virginia's

artificial insemination statute to the situation. The custody of
the

child would depend

on

the

surrogate's

disregard the intent of the parties

marital

and what

status

is best

for

and
the

child.

Thus the natural father could rely on Syrkowski v.
Appleyard 24 and attempt to convince the court that the artificial
insemination statute was not meant to apply to Surrogate Parenting
arrangements.

Surrogate

Parenting

should

be

recognized

as

an

exception and the biological father should be allowed to prove his
paternity.
Assuming that the father can establish paternity, the court
must then decide in whose custody to place the child.
court to uphold a custody agreement, the

co~tracting

For the

parents first

have to show there was a voluntary relinquishment of custody by
the

parent of the child by clear,
cogent and convincing
evidence. 25 Although the surrogate mother can claim that she was
not informed of and did not understand all the ramifications of
the agreement,

surrogate arrangements usually require the mother

to go through counseling to ensure that she understands the nature
of her agreement. Evidence of this counseling could then be used
by the contracting couple to prove the surrogate's understanding.
Even

if

the

court

upholds

the

contract

as

a

custody

it still has to apply conventional custody factors to
determine the best interests of the child. 26 The welfare of the

agreement,

24 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985), (The Michigan Supreme
Court overruled the Court of Appeals decision that the court
lacked jurisdiction because the action was beyond the scope and
purpose of the Paternity Act when a father sought an order of
filiation declaring his paternity in a surrogate arrangement.),
rev'd 122 Mich. App. 506, 33 N.W.2d 90 (1983).
-ZS-Shortridge v. Deel, 224 Va. 589, 299 S.E.2d 500 (1983).
26 Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.2(1) provides: "The court, in
determining the custody ••. shall consider the following: a. The age
and physical and mental condition of the child; b. The age and
physical and mental condition of each parent; c. The relationship
existing between each parent and each child; d. The needs of the
child; e. The role which each parent has played, and will play in
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child is the primary, paramount and controlling consideration of
the court in custody disputes. 27 There is no presumption in favor
of either parent. 28
In a Surrogate Parenting agreement the age and physical and
mental

condition

determining
better

of

the

child

custody.

The

court may

equipped

to

deal

with

will
a

have

little

consider

if

influence
one

parent

particular physical

in
is

or mental

handicap of the child.
In

Stern

v.

Whitehead,

the

age

and

physical

and

mental

condition of each parent had a significant effect on the court's
decision regarding custody.

Both the

surrogate mother's mental

stability and the reasons for the contracting mother's delay in
childbirth were

the

subj ect

of consideration,

and the

court's

ultimate decision was affected by evidence about Mrs. Whitehead's
mental health.
The
homosexual

court

will

also

couple's

encounter

desire

to have
person's right to have a chi1d. 30

circumstances
a

chi1d,29

such

and

a

as

a

single

In examining the relationship between each parent and the
child, the court may examine the psychological bonding between the
natural mother and the child and the prior mental "conception" of
the child by the contracting coup1e. 31 However, the court is most
concerned with

the

best

interest

of

the

child,

and

therefore

examines with which parent the child has developed bonding. It is
important who was given temporary custody, because the courts look
to the primary caretaker first to see if there is bonding and are
reluctant

to

jeapardize

the

child's

stability

by

changing

custody.
In assessing the needs of the child, the relative financial
stability of the parents will be important.
arrangements

usually

involve

a

contracting

Surrogate Parenting
couple

which

is

wealthier than the surrogate and her husband, if any. Because the

the future, in the upbringing and care of the child; and f. Such
other factors as are necessary to consider the best interests of
the child.
27 Durrette v. Durrette, 223 Va. 328, 288 S.E.2d 432 (1982).
28 Va. Code Ann. §20-107. 2 (1) (Supp. 1986).
29 Jane Doe v. Jane Doe, 222 Va. 736, 284 S.E.2d 799 (1981), in
which the natural mother's lesbian life-style was a proper factor
to consider in determining her fitness as a mother and the best
interest of the child.
30 See Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights
of the Unmarried, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 669 (1985).
31 Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive
Technologies, 96 Yale L. J. 187, 194-97 (1986).
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court can consider who can provide better education and medical
care, the wealthier couple will have the advantage.
Similarly, in assessing the role which each parent has played
and will play in the future in the upbringing and care of the
child,

the wealthier contracting couple will have an advantage

over the surrogate and her husband because of their ability to
provide a greater variety of opportunity for the child.
Remedies for Breach of Contract
If surrogate contracts are upheld,

the court is faced with

the problem of deciding what are the appropriate remedies for a
breach of contract. Monetary damages are inadequate. The only way
the

contracting

couple

would

be

adequately

compensated

is

by

ensuring that they get the desparately wanted child.
Some moral and legal problems arise when specific performance
forces a mother to give up her child.

Commentators note that a

court is unlikely to wrest a child out of it's natural mother's
arms. 32

Research

emotional
attachment
histories

has

shown

attachment
between
of

to

that

the

mother

surrogate

child

and

mothers

which

they

is

apparent

child

develop

carry. 33
in

an

"This

the

case

even those surrogates who have parted with their

newborns.,,34 While the surrogate contracts that she will not form
or attempt to form a bond to the child, "even the best intentioned
surrogates develop an emotional attachment to the child they are
carrying. ,,35
However,
natural

refusing

mother

to

breaches

award

the

specific

performance

when

the

surrogate contract would leave no

adequate remedy for the natural father. Specific performance as an
equi table
(surrogate)

remedy

should balance the

against

the

benefit

to

hardship
the

to

the

plaintiff

defendant

(contracting

couple) that would ensue from the enforcement of the contract. In
balancing the equities, the court should consider both the mental
and

physical

intent

to

aspects

conceive

of

conception:

predates

the

the

contracting

surrogate

mother's

couple's
physical

conception, and her pregnancy would not have occured but for the
contracting couple's intent to have a
the

32
33
34
35
36

surrogate

method,

manifesting

child. 36 Thus the use of

procreative

intent,

Cohen, supra n. 19, at 260.
M. Klaus & J. Kennell, Maternal-Infant Bonding (1976).
Cohen, supra n. 19 at 260 & n. 130.
Id. at 26l.
Stumpf, supra n. 35 at 195.
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should

invoke

the

intenders.

legal

presumption

that

the

child

belongs

to

the

The court can then order specific performance of the

contract giving custody to the contracting couple.
By

presuming

that

the

contracting

couple

are

the

legal

parents after birth, but allowing the surrogate mother to contest
the presumption, both the pre-birth and after-birth psychological
and

psysiological factors can be factored in to the custody
decision. 37 A parent seeking to change custody previously awarded
to the other parent (or relinquished) bears the burden of showing
that

a return of the child is in the best interest of the
child. 38 Similarly where the court enforces a surrogate contract
and the father gets custody of the child, the mother would have

the burden of proving that a change in custody is in the child's
best

interest. 39

The

contracting

couple

would

know

that

the

surrogate could challenge the contract or custody but be willing
to risk it just as in adoption contracts.

A liquidated damages

clause would establish the amount the surrogate would have to pay
for the breach.
This solution allows balancing of the competing interests in
the child and still allows new reproductive techniques. It allows
the mother some control over whether to give the child up while
also protecting the biological father and the original intent of
the parties. It is an appropriate remedy in Virginia where courts
consider the

interests of both of the parents

along

with the

welfare of the child.
Policy Recommendations
Surrogate

Parenting

agreements

serve

a

need

by

allowing

couples who want to have a child but are unable to conceive to
obtain a child biologically related to the male of the couple. It
has been acceptable for years to use artificial insemination to
obtain children biologically related to the female of a couple. 40
37 In determining the custody of infants, the natural rights of
the parents are entitled to due consideration. Burton v. Russell,
190 Va. 339, 57 S.E.2d 95 (1958). But the welfare of the child is
to be regarded more highly than the technical legal rights of the
parent. Forbes v. Haney, 204 Va. 712, 133 S.E.2d 533 (1963).
38 Harper v. Harper, 217 Va. 477, 229 S.E.2d 875 (1976).
39 Shortridge v. Deel, 224 Va. 589, 299 S.E.2d 500 (1983), (Once
relinquishment of custody is established, the natural parent who
seeks to regain custody must bear the burden of proving that such
change is in the child's best interest.)
40 The Uniform Parentage Act, which is in force in 15 states
not including Virginia, (see supra. n. 12), serves to make
artificial insemination acceptable by legitimizing a child born to
a married woman through artificial insemination, protecting the
anonymity of the sperm donor and putting the woman's husband's
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Confusion arises

over surrogate

necessary involvement of a

Parenting

only because

of

the

woman to carry and bear the child.

Legislation must take into account and clearly define her legal
status.
We propose that
parenthood

Act

be

legislative action similar to the uniform
taken

with

the

goal

of

legalizing

and

recognizing Surrogate Parenting agreements as an acceptable method
of reproduction.
Parties which must be involved are: the contracting couple,
the surrogate, physicians who will perform the insemination, care
for the pregnant surrogate and deliver. the baby, an attorney for
the couple and an attorney for the surrogate.
A couple wishing to have a child would file a request with
a clinic charged with approving couples for this purpose, and they
would be evaluated as to whether or not they would provide a good
home

for

the

proposed

child.

This

preliminary custody

finding

would be presumptively valid and could not be challenged unless at
the time the child was born there had been a signifigant change in
the position of the couple: they had separated or divorced, one of
them had died, became disabled or mentally ill, or there had been
a significant change in their financial position.
with a preliminary custody finding the clinic would proceed
to employ the surrogate.

She must have been evaluated medically

Ind

be

psychologically

and

fully

emotional and legal risks

involved.

medical

as

and

legal

bills

they

informed

as

to

the

medical,

The couple pays all of her
are

incurred,

take

a

life

insurance policy on her for the benefit of her heirs, bond her for
performance,

and pay her one-half of the agreed upon fee at the

time she is inseminated.
Upon the birth of the child the paternity is confirmed, the
father is listed on the birth certificate and the surrogate gives
up the child to the wife in a step-parent adoption after the court
confirms the preliminary custody finding.

When this is complete

the second half of the fee is paid to the surrogate.
At two points the surrogate's special role as mother must be
taken into account. While she is pregnant she has the right to
decide to· abort the fetus. 41 If she does so she must reimburse
name on the birth certificate even though he is not the biological
father. Va. Code § 32.1-257(0) (1950) has substantially the same
effect by legitimizing the child born of artificial insemination
to a married woman and maintains a fiction of the paternity of the
woman's husband.
41 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
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the couple for all expenses to that date and a performance bond in
her name pays the couple liquidated damages . After the birth of
the child,

if she succesfully challenges the preliminary custody

finding and retains the child she must reimburse the couple for
expenses and for liquidated damages.
We place a strong incentive on the, surrogate to go through
with the contract because she is only an accesory to the couple's
decision to have a
state nor
decision.

the

child.

Were the couple fertile

surrogate would be

able

to

neither the

interfere

with

that

In an adoption proceeding the state must decide if the

couple is a fit pair to raise an existing child. Here, the child
does not exist yet, and the state should have minimal control over
whether or not a couple can become parents.
An

ideal

regulatory scheme will

encourage the creation of

licensed Surrogate Parenting clinics which would have staffs of
trained doctors, counselors and attorneys. They would have contact
with a number of surrogates of proven medical and psychological
fitness.

They would create

limiting

the

reducing

the

medical
cost

to

and

standardized methods
legal

risk

interested

to

all

couples

and procedures

parties

and

involved,

maximizing

the

availability of this solution to the problem of infertility.
Virginia would be in the forefront of states by legitimizing
and regulating Surrogate Parenting Agreements and would provide a
great service to it's citizens who wish to become parents but are
unable to do so.
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SEX DISCRIMINATION IN ATHLETICS

By
Steven T. Buck*
Discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs is
prohibitied both by federal law I and by the Constitution. 2 Despite
this fact, intercollegiate athletics continue to be a male domain 3 ,
resisting change and integration nearly as fervently as the post-Brown
South. Disparity in treatment continues and a substantial basis
exists, both constitutional and statutory, for asserting unequal
protection of the law.
This Comment is an attempt to analyze the current state of gender
discrimination in athletics. The applicability of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 to Virginia athletic programs
particularly intercollegiate athletics -- will be studied.
Effect of Title IX

Dispari ty between the rights of males and females in Amer ican
society has been the norm,4 and athletics have proven to be no
exception. 5 While Congress, by enacting Title IX, was primarily
attempting to eliminate sex discrimination in education, its effect on
intercollegiate athletics has received the most public attention and
caused the greatest controversy.6
Congress' delegated formation and enforcement of regulations
defining the statute's broad language to the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW).? HEW's implementing regulations apply
the statute's broad prohibition against sex discrimination to specific
education programs, including intercollegiate athletics. 8
Title IX provides that "[nlo person ••• shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from part.icipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subject to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving federal funds."9 The conflict in interpretation has come in
defining the term "program". A debate rages as to whether the statute
should apply only to particular programs within an institution (the
programmatic approach), or whether it should encompass all programs
within institutions receiving federal funds {the institutional

*
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approach) • This controversy especially applies to the area of
athletics since very few federal gr~nts are earmarked for athletic
programs.l O Therefore, a strictly programmatic approach would tend to
make Title IX virtually meaningless as it relates to athletics.
The legislative history of Title IX provides little evidence as
to Congress' intentions regaroing the statute's applicability to
intercollegiate ath1etics. ll Only after Congress realized that HEvl's
regulations included athletic programs did Congress pause to consider
the ramifications of such an action. Several efforts to exempt
athletics from the statute's scope were thwarted. 12 Congress chose
instead to enact the Javits Amendment, which called for the Secretary
of HEW to publish regulations implementing Title IX "which shall
include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable
provisions considering the nature of particular sports."13 Congres~
thus clearly felt that athletic programs fell within the scope of
Title IX.
As the legislative history provides no clear indication of the
intended meaning of the words "program or activity", parallels between
Title IX and analogous statutes could prove helpful. The language
contained in both Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 14 and
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 15 is identical to that
of Title IX 16, and similar issues have arisen under these statutes.
Under Title VI, the Fourth Circuit has held that even indirect
federal aid 17 to a university can trigger enforcement of Title VI on
an institution-wide basis. 18 The same rationale was adopted in
Yakin v. University of Illinois,19 allowing Yakin to sue for wrongful
dismissal under Title VI despite the fact that that the psychology
department in which he worked received no federal funds. In contrast,
the Fifth Circuit took a strict programmatic approach. 20
Two recent district court decisions under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Wright v. Columbia university2l and
Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education,22 took an institutional
approach to intepreting the statute.
Both cases involved
discrimination against the handicapped in athletics, making the issues
involved significantly similar to those arising under Title IX.
In Wright, the plaintiff claimed relief under section 504
claindng that Columbia University was discriminating against him by
not allowing him to play football because he had sight only in his
left eye. The plaintiff claimed, and his coaches agreed, that he was
otherwise qualified to play. Columbia claimed that plaintiff had no
section 504 action because Columbia's athletic program did not receive
federal funds and therefore was outside the statute's scope. The
court held that because the school as a whole received federal funds

41

and because the school administration (not the athletic department,
which sided with the plaintiff) had discriminated against plaintiff,
an institutional approach would best serve to effectuate the
underlying policy of the statute in this case. The court enjoined the
defendant's discrinlinatory act.ions.
In Poole, a student with only one kidney brought an action under
section 504 against the school board for denying him the right to
participate in his high school's interscholastic wrestling program due
to his handicap. lUthough the athletic departD.ent did not receive any
federal funds, the court relied on the elerr.ent of control exercised by
the school board over the program in applying the institutional
approach in this case.
Courts also have interpreted Title IX's "program or activity"
term in contexts other than athletics. Two recent Supreme Court
cases, North Haven Board of Education v. Bel1 23 and Grove City
College v. Bell,24 have preempted the field on this question. These
cases read in tander,. answer many questions in the programmatic versus
institutional debate, while raj sing nlany new questions.
North Haven involved a tenured school teacher who was not rehired
after taking what was to be a one year maternity leave. The teacher
filed a Title IX complaint with HEW claiming sex discrin1ination in a
program receiving federal funds.
HEW began to investigate the
employment practices of the North Haven School Board. Asserting that
HEW lacked authority to regulate employment practices under Title IX,
the Board sought declaratory relief. 25 The Second Circuit held for
HEW and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court held that Title IX must be given a broad sweep to
effectuate its remedial purposesi26 therefore, employillent
discrimination in federally financed education programs falls within
its scope. The Cou rt did not read "prog ram or act i vi ty" so broadly
however. "Title IX's legislative history corraborates its general
program-specificity."27 The Court then refused to define "program",
preferring instead to rely on a Fift_h Circuit decision holding that
federal funds may be terminated upon a finding that they "are infected
by a discriminatory environment •• 28 If discrimination is found, the
Court held that the federal funds would be so infected. Although the
Court continually emphasized the program-specific nature of Title IX,
the analysis it used appeared very similar to the instututional
approach.
Grove City involved a suit by Grove City College and four of its
students which sought to declare void a Department of Education (ED)
action terminating federal financial assistance to students attending
the college. 29 This action was taken in response to the college's
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refusal to execute an Assurance of Compliance with ED regulations
prohibiting sex discrimination in educational programs receiving
federal financial assistance. The college claimed both that i t did
not receive federal financial assistance within the IT.eaning of Title
IX and that the ED had never proven sex discrimination in any program
or activity at the college. 30
The Court held that Grove City College did indeed receive federal
funds within the meaning of Title IX. Federal funds which are
funneled into the school through Basic Educational Opportunity Grants
(BEaG) to students attending the school (so-called indirect aid)
trigger Title IX coverage as surely as do federal funds going directly
to the school. The Court cited Bob Jones University v.
Johnson 31
and the legislative history of Title IX as supporting that result. 32
The court then held that a finding of actual discrimination was
not necessary before the termination of federal funds. A refusal to
execute a proper Assurance of Compliance warranted the Department's
action because Title IX requires compliance with all regulations
adopted pursuant thereto. 33
Although these two issues were the only ones presented by this
case, the Court went on to hold that the receipt of BEOG grants by the
college's students diel not trigger institution-wide coverage under
Title IX. The BEaG funds represented financial assistance to the
college's financial aid program; thus, that program was held to be
properly regulated under Title IX. The fact that federal funds
eventually reach the college's general operating budget cannot subject
it to institution-wide coverage. The majority opinion spoke in no
uncertain terms of the program-specific nature of Title IX, and
applied it consistent with that nature. 34
Very vocal support was given the institutional approach by
Justice Brennan writing in elissent. 35 According to Brennan, the Court
completely disregarded the broad remedial purposes of Title IX that
controlled in North Haven. He also attacked the programmatic approach
as contrary to congressional intent as shown by the legislative
history.36
Brennan's view of the majority oplnJ.on may be a bit pessimistic,
however.
The Court's opinion in Grove City diel not reject
institution-wide coverage in general, but only on the facts of that
case. 37 The Court seemed to suggest in dicta that nonearmarked
grants, for example, would trigger institution wide-coverage. 38 The
Court merely disapproved of the "ripple effect" theory -- that funds
earmarked for one program necessarily freed up funds for other
programs creating an institution-wide effect in every case.
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Title IX and Athletics

Several cases have dealt directly with Title IX's impact on
athletic programs. Courts and jurisdictions are almost evenly split
as to whether to apply Title IX using an institutional or programmatic
approach.
The Third Circuit in Haffer v. Temple 39 adopted the institutional
approach to Title IX. Haffer involved a class action brought by
Temple students alleging sex discrimination in the university's
athletic programs. The Court found first that opportunities and
expenditures for the men's programs were grossly disproportionate to
those given the women's programs. The Court next found that although
none of the $19,000,000 in federal assistance given to Temple was
earmarked for the athletic department, the receipt of these funds
benefitted all areas of the university and triggered institution-wide
Title IX coverage. 40 Haffer relied heavily on the Third Circuit's
earlier ruling in Grove City College v. Bell. 4l I t remains unclear how
Haffer's precedential value will be affected by the subsequent Supreme
Court modification of Grove City.
The Sixth Circuit was unimpressed by this analysis, ruling in
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board 42 that a fair reading of the plain
language of Title IX demands the adoption of the programmatic
approach. Othen involved an allegation of sex discrimination in an
Ann Arbor athletic program. 43 The only federal funds received by the
school district were federal impact grants. 44 Because these funds
were indirect and nonearmarked, the court held that they could not be
considereo to bring athletic programs wi thin the scope of Title IX.
The authority of this holoing, however, m.ay be affected by dicta in
Grove City College v. Bel1 4S suggesting that nonearmarked aid, either
direct or inoirect, could trigger institution-wide coverage.
In University of Richmond (UR) v. Bell,46 the university sought
injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the Department of
Education from investigating its athletic program for Title IX
violations. UR claimed that because its athletic department received
no federal funds, it could not be subject to Title IX regulation. The
court, relying heavily on the dicta in North Haven supporting the
programmatic approach,47 rejected the ED's contention that BEOG funds
combined with Library Resource Grants 48 could be sufficient to trigger
institution-wide Title IX coverage.
The court instead ruled that the Library Resource Grants could
only trigger Title IX coverage for the library program, and that BEOG
funds were not direct aid and could not trigger Title IX coverage at
all. Therefore, the athletic program did not fall within the scope of
Title IX and the ED was enjoined from investigating any program or
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activity within the district court's juristiction "absent a showing
that the program or activity is the receipient of direct federal
financial assitance (emphasis added) ."49 The authority of this case
is, of course, questionable as its distinction between direct and
indirect federal assistance was expressly overruled by the Supreme
Court in Grove City College v. Bell. 50
It is readily apparent that the case law before 1984 can be only
marginally useful in determining the present state of Title IX
analysis. Grove City completely altered the Title IX landscape.
It now renlains for the courts of appeals to analyze and interpret this
holding.
The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on Grove City in
Arline v. School Board of Nassau County. 51 The case involved Arline,
a school teacher who had been fired due to her relapses of
tuberculosis. Arline sued in federal court alleging a violation of
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court first considered
whether federal impact aid 52 qualified as "federal financial
~ssistance" under section 504 and if so, whether such assistance
triggered coverage of plaintiff's program. The court held that impact
funds were clearly nonearmarked monies which, according to the dicta
in
Grove City , triggered institution-wide coverage. The court
reasoned that adoption of this approach gave full effect to the broad
legislative intent expressed in section 504.
A comprehensive and thoughtful analysis refining and analyzing
the scope of Title IX as it relates to Grove City was provided in
O'Connor v. Peru State College,53 an Eighth Circuit decision dealing
with Title IX's application to athletic programs. This case involved
a women's basketball coach who was not rehired and brought a Title IX
sex discrimination action against the college.
The federal financial assistance relied upon by O'Connor was a
Title III faculty research grant. 54 A central research facility wo.s
established, and the physical education department was granted access
to the facility and funds. The district court held that the funds did
not constitute federal financiol assistance under Title IX because the
funds did not go "directly" to the physical education department and
because other departments of the school also benefitted. 55
The appellate court overruled this finding, citing Grove Citv as
expressly rejecting the direct/indirect funding distinctions. Just as
the student aid in Grove City was no less federal funds for being
channeled through students, the research funds were no less federal
funds for being channelled through an administrative structure.
The district court concluded that granting Title IX coverage to
the physical education department would be a ratification of the
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institutional approach, a result the district court believed to be
contrary to Grove City. The appellate court disagreed again, holding
that the SuprelTle Court in Grove City did not reject institution-wide
coverage in general, but only on the facts of the case. The Court
contemplated that nonearnl<irkE'o funds would trigger program-specific
coverage. Consistent with this dichotomy, the Court explicitly
rejected the "ripple effect" theory.
The Eighth Circuit Court believed that the earmarked/
nonearrearked dichotomy was the appropriate approach in light of
Grove City, and that it could be a workable standard if the term
earmarked is correctly defined. 57 The Court in Grove City held that
the federal funds were "earmarked" for the financial aid program
hecause Congress' purpose was to supplement the college's own
financial aid resources. Thus, if Congress intended that Title III
funds should be available to all departlTlents within the college, all
should fall within Title IX's coverage. The court held that this was
indeed Congress' intent in this instance. 58
Analysis

Sex discrimination in athletics can be psychologically damaging
to the woman athlete. 59 Denial of the opportunity to participate in
athletic programs may halt a woman athlete's further development thus
denying her both the physical and psychological benefits of sport. 60
Although women increasingly do participate in interscholastic and
intercollegiate athletics, equality of opportunity and funding between
men's and women's programs has not yet been attained. 61
The stated goal of Title IX is the elimination of sex
discrimination in education. The legislative intent underlying the
statute consisted of both a desire to ensure through educational
opportunity that all Americans develop their full potential, and a
desire to eliminate sex stereotyping in our society.62
All that remains is to establish an approach which allows a court
to reach a result that satisfies the spirit of Title IX without
straining the statute's language beyond its logical meaning. The
approach taken by the Supreme Court in Grove City goes far toward such
a goal.
The elimination of the direct/indirect financial aid
dichotomy found in many lower courts substantially furthered the
spirit of Title IX without contradicting its plain language.
The earmarked/nonearmarked financial aid dichotomy, with its
express disapproval of the "ripple effect" theory, has been severely
criticized by some commentators who claim that it undermines the
spirit and underlying policy of Title IX.63 These commentators point
out that this interpretation could allow institutions to circumvent
the remedial purpose of Title IX.64

Such an analysis, however, could be reading Grove City too
broadly. The Supremem Court acknowleged that the legislative history
contained evidence "that entire institutions are subject to the
nondiscrimination provision whenever one of their programs receives
federal assistance" but that such a condition was not warranted by the
"circumstances present here."65 It is unfortunate that the Court did
not elaborate as to what circumstances would trigger institution-wide
coverage in the case of an earmarked grant.
North Haven provides an example of such a circumstance. While
stressing the program-specific nature of Title IX, the Court stated
that where federal funds in one program are "infected by a
discriminatory environment" created by a second program, both programs
must come within Title IX's scope. 66
The Court quoted
Board of Public Instruction of Taylor County Florida v. Finch,67 a
case involving discrimination in admissions policies.
Such
discrimination was held to infect all programs within the system,
subjecting all to Title IX coverage.
Another such circumstance may be analogized from the holdings in
Poole and Wright. These cases stand for the proposition that i f the
university as a whole was the official or actual decisionmaker in
promulgating the discriminatory rule or action, institution-wide
coverage should apply.68 This approach prevents "programs" which are
not really discrete entities but merely controlled subsidiaries from
insulating themselves from Title IX coverage.
This earmarked/nonearmarked dichotomy, limited to the facts of
Grove City by exceptions such as the aforementioned, would in reality
not be the bane to sexual equality its critics claim. Very few
athletic departments are not controlled by college presidents or
university boards of visitors, and those very few that are totally
independent clearly must come within the program-specific language of
the statute.
Conclusion

Title IX actions are very rare in Virginia athletics.
University of Richmond v. Bell, by applying a strictly programmatic
approach, has had a chilling efffect on the bringing of similiar
suits. Such a result sharply contradicts the legislative purpose
behind Title IX. A new approach consistent with Grove City,
North Haven, the language of the statute, and the legislative intent
is needed.
Neither the strictly programmatic nor the strictly institutional
approach to Title IX can successfully reconcile the program-specific
language of the statute with its underlying policy goals. Courts are
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obligated to honor the clear meaning of the statute, as revealed by
its language, purpose, and history.70 Therefore, courts must look
closely at the relationship between the federal assistance and the
athletic department.
If the athletic program benefits, either
directly or indirectly from the federal funds, or is controlled by
someone who does, it should be subject to the anti-discrimination
policies of Title IX.
In this way, Virginia's courts can continue to honor the clear
language of the statute, while still moving toward the statute's
ultimate goal of sexual equality. Such a reading will not end sex
discrimination in athletics, but it should land several well-aimed
blows.
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VIRGINIA'S NEW MANDATORY SEAT BELT LEGISLATION:
DEATH KNELL FOR THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE
By E. Diana Hamner and John H. Pitcher, Jr ••
On March 27,
the

District

of

1987, Virginia joined twenty-four states plus
Columbia

requiring

mandatory

seat

belt

use. 1

Passage of the legislation was the cUlmination of five years of
consideration

by

the

Virginia

General

Assembly. 2

Across

the

nation state legislatures have given recent attention to seat belt
laws because of intense lobbying by automobile manufacturers 3 in
response to the Department of Transportation's (DOT) enactment of
the

Occupant

Crash

Protection

Rule

in

1984. 4

The

DOT

will

require manufacturers to equip all cars with air bags or frontseat automatic belts beginning in 1990 unless states containing
two-thirds

of the population adopt seat belt

laws by April 1,

1989. 5

• Ms. Hamner is a second year student at Marshall-Wythe, and
she has a B.S. in Business from Wake Forest University. Mr.
Pitcher is a first year student. He has a B.A. in Political
Science from Catholic University.
IVa. Code § 46.1-309.2 (March 27, 1987). See Cal. Veh.
Code § 27315 (West Supp. 1987); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14100a (West supp. 1987); D.C. Code Ann. § 40-1601 (1986); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 316.614 (West Supp. 1987); Haw. Rev. Stat. §
291-11.6 (1985); Idaho Code § 49-764 (Supp. 1986); 111. Ann.
Stat. ch. 95.5, para. 12-603.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); Iowa
Code Ann. § 321.445 (West Supp. 1987); Ran. Stat. Ann. § 82501 (Supp. 1986); La. Rev. Stat. Annn. § 32.295.1 (West
Supp. 1987); Md. Transp. Code Ann. § 22-412.3 (Supp. 1986);
Mich. Camp. Laws Ann. § 257.710e (West Supp. 1987); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 169.686 (West 1986); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 307.178
(Vernon Supp. 1987); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39.3-76.2f (West Supp.
1986); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-7-370 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. Veh. &
Traf. Law § 1229-c (McKinney 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20135.2A (Supp. 1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4513.26.3
(Anderson Supp. 1986); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 12-416
(West Supp. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-603 (Supp. 1986)
(repealed effective June 30, 1990); Tex. Rev. civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 6701d (Vernon Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-181
(Supp. 1986); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 46.61.688 (1987).
Nevada also has a statute on the books, but effective date
has not been determined. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 484.641
(Michie 1986).
2Del. J. Samuel Glasscock (D-Suffolk), sponsor of the seat
belt bill, introduced a similar measure during the 1983-1986
Sessions of the Virginia General Assembly.
3In Virginia alone in 1986, approximately $200,000 went
into a statewide educational program and lobbying on behalf
of the seat belt bill. Richmond Times Dispatch, Feb. 5,
1986, at A-5, col. 1.
449 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1985). The purpose of the rule is to
reduce the number of traffic deaths and severe injuries to
automobile occupants. See id.
SId.
-
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The

DOT has outlined minimum criteria

safety belt usage

laws

passive

rule. 6

restraint

required to
One

of

for

prevent enforcement of the

the

requirements

seat belt defense be allowed by the defendant
damages. 7

The

seat

belt

defense

state mandatory

"refers

to

is

that

the

in mitigation of
attempts

to

have

testimony regarding a plaintiff's failure to use an available seat
belt at the time of an accident admitted into evidence to show
either

the

plaintiff's

damages. ,,8 A defendant who

negligence

or

failure

to

mitigate

invokes the seat belt defense tries

to prove that the plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt caused or
aggravated the plaintiff's injuries, thus reducing or barring the
recoverable damages. 9

By denying plaintiff's

full

recovery

for

injuries resulting from automobile accidents if they fail to wear
a

seat belt,

"the seat belt defense may prove to be

incentive to use seat belts than a

traffic

ticket

far more

or a

minor

fine. ,,10
The new Virginia law fails to meet the federal requirements
because it clearly outlaws the use of a violation of the section
on the mitigation of damages issue, forbidding the use of the seat
belt

defense

in

Virginia. 11

The

General

Assembly

had

previously mandated that the failure to use seat belts "shall not
be deemed to be negligence nor shall evidence of such nonuse of

6S ee id.
7The law must include:
A provision specifying that the violation of the belt
usage requirement may be used to mitigate damages with
respect to any person who is involved in a passenger car
accident while violating the belt usage requirement and who
seeks in any subsequent litigation to recover damages for
injuries resulting from the accident.
49 C.F.R .. § 571.208.
8Marema, A New Perspective on the Duty to Buckle Up, 27 For
the Def 23 (1985). This article's focus is on the use of the
seat belt defense in the mitigation of damages.
9Westenberg, The Safety belt Defense at Trial and In Outof-Court settlement, 37 U. Fla. L. Rev. 785 at 785 (1985).
lOId. at 29. But see Miller v. Miller, 237 N.C. at 237, 160
S.E.2d at 73 (1968).
11The Bill provides:
A violation of this section shall not constitute
negligence, be considered in mitigation of damages of
whatever nature, be admissible in evidence or be the subject
of comment by counsel in any action for the recovery of
damages arising out of the operation, ownership or
maintenance of a motor vehicle, nor shall anything in this
section change any existing law, rule or procedure pertaining
to any such civil action.
Va. Code Ann. § 46.1-309.2(E).
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such devices be considered in mitigation of damages of whatever
nature. ,,12 Several other states have also specifically precluded
the use of the seat belt defense in mitigation of damages despite
the DOT's requirements. 13 The possibility exists that if enough
states adopt mandatory seat belt laws,

the DOT requirement of a

seat belt defense will be modified. 14
The Virginia Law:

Va. Code

46.1-309.2

§

Passage of Virginia's new mandatory seat belt use law was a
long fought victory, but a weak one in terms of enforcement of the
law and incentives to ensure usage of seat belts.
requires

most

belts.15

The

drivers
bill

and

was

front-seat

passed

only

The new law

passengers

after much

to

use

seat

compromise.

The

law is essentially identical to the bill that the Senate approved
during the 1986 session but was defeated on a tie-breaking vote by
Lt.

Gov.

L.

Virginia

Douglas

General

Wilder.

Assembly,

During
the

the

Senate

1987
voted

session

of

down

measure

a

the

allowing a voter referendum to determine the fate of the seat belt
law. 16
The mandatory seat belt law will become effective January 1,
1988. 17

During

1987,

the

state

police

and

the

Department

of

Motor Vehicles will conduct a campaign to encourage compliance and
public awareness.
"mere

presence

Legislators hope
in

the

code

that

[will]

the

seat

encourage

belt

law's

thousands

of

Virginians to buckle up.,,18
The law includes several exemptions. If a licensed physician
determines that use of a
reasons,

a

person will

seat belt is

be

exempt

if

impractical
he

carries

for medical
the

doctor's

statement with him. 19 The law does not apply to law enforcement
officers
newspaper

in

certain

route

situations. 20

carriers,

newspaper

Rural

mail

bundle

carriers,

handlers,

rural

newspaper

12Va. Code Ann. § 46.1-309.1 (1986).
13D.C., Ind., Kan. and utah. See statutes cited supra note
1.

14Richmond Times Dispatch, Feb. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
15Va. Code § 46.1-309.2 (March 27, 1987).
16Richmond Times Dispatch, Feb. 17, 1987, at 1, col. 3. The
Senate voted 23 to 16 against a seat belt referendum.
17Va. Code § 46.1-309.2(2) (March 27, 1987).
18Richmond Times Dispatch, Mar. 8, 1986, at A-6, col. 1.
19Va. Code § 46.1-309.2 (C) (1) (March 27, 1987).
20Va. Code § 46.1-309.2(C) (2) (March 27, 1987).
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rack

carriers

and

taxicab

drivers

are

all

exempt

from

the

statute. 21
The only punishment for a violation of the law is a twentyfive dollar civil penalty that will be credited to the Literary
Fund. 22 A violation of the section can in no way be used against
the violator in court. 23

The greatest amount of debate in the

1986 session centered on the method of charging motorists with a
violation.
enforcing

The approved version of the law restricts police to
the

seat belt

law only after they

have charged the

driver for an unrelated motor vehicle violation such as running a
stop

sign

allowing

or

speeding.

police

violation. 24

to

The

In

charge
House

version. 25 Essentially,

1986,

the

motorists

would

not

Senate
any

urged

time

approve

a

version

they
this

see

a

stronger

law-abiding citizens who refuse to wear

a seat belt will never be charged with a violation of the seat
belt law.
The Seat Belt Defense
The question of whether a plaintiff's nonuse of an available
seat belt is admissible in mitigation of damages has produced a
split of authority.

A sUbstantial

number of courts which have

considered the seat belt defense in terms of mitigation of damages
have decided that evidence of nonuse may not be admitted.
minority

position

allows

admittance

of

such

evidence.

The
This

article surveys both positions to draw conclusions about whether
the

virginia

General

Assembly

might

consider

amending the

new

21Va. Code § 46.1-309.2(C) (3) and (C) (4) (March 27, 1987).
"Del. William P. Robinson Jr., D-Norfolk, said that the
exemption for taxi drivers was needed because some. have had
belts used to restrain them during robberies." Richmond
Times Dispatch, Jan. 31, 1986, at A-10, col. 1.
22Va. Code § 46.1-309.2(0) (March 27, 1987). The Virginia
law complies with DOT criteria which requires a penalty of
not less than $25.00. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208.
23S ee supra n. 11.
24Richmond Times Dispatch, Feb. 26, 1986, at A-6, col. 1.
25Some legislators feared that law enforcement officers
would use the law to harrass violators if given the freedom
to charge motorists any time they saw a violation. Telephone
interview with Delegate J. Samuel Glasscock, sponsor of the
seat belt bill (Mar. 30, 1987).
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mandatory seat belt statute in the future to include the use of
the seat belt defense. 26
Jurisdictions Not Recognizing the seat Belt Defense
The use of the seat belt defense in mitigation of damages has
encountered a number of obstacles. The most prevalent argument is
that the seat belt defense for mitigation of damages conflicts
with

a

number

of

traditional

tort

doctrines. 27

In

states

adhering to the contributory negligence doctrine 28 , any negligent
conduct by the plaintiff will bar all recovery. Most courts find
this result unjust: "[i]t would be a harsh and unsound rule which
would deny all recovery to the plaintiff, whose mere failure to
buckle

his

exonerate

belt
the

in

active

no

way

contributed

tort-feasor

but

to

for

the

accident,

and

whose negligence the

plaintiff's omission would have been harmless. 1129 Alternatively,
II

[t] 0

admit

such evidence

of nonuse would permit the

jury to

'compare the damages' which in practical effect might reach almost
the same result as 'comparative negligence. ,"30
Allowing evidence of plaintiff's nonuse of an available seat
belt also runs counter to the traditional notion in tort theory
that unless put on notice to the contrary, one is not required to
anticipate

another's

negligence. 31

The

failure

to

anticipate

another's negligence is insufficient negligence to provide a bar
for

recovery

for

injuries. 32

No

duty

to

anticipate

another's

negligence exists in the absence of a statute to the contrary.33

26There are three possible applications of the seat belt
defense:
(1) negligence per se, (2) contributory negligence,
and (3) mitigation of damages. The most successful
application has been the mitigation theory, which will be the
focus of this article.
27See Westenberg, supra note 9, at 788.
28virginia, along with Alabama, the District of Columbia,
Maryland, North Carolina and South Carolina, has not adopted
the comparative negligence doctrine. Id. at 836-40.
29Miller, 273 N.C. at 237, 160 S.E.2d at 73.
30Britton v. Doehring, 287 Ala. 498, ___ , 242 So. 2d 666,
675 (1970). See also Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.R.D.
132, 138 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
31See Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530,
,521 P.2d 161,
163-cI974); Miller 273 N.C. at 234, 180 S.E.2d at 70.
32Libscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. Super. ct.
1967) .
33Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio App. 2d 50,
,269 N.E.2d 53,
59, rev'd on other grounds 29 Ohio st. 2d 99, 279 N.E.2d 878
(1971) •
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The doctrine of avoidable consequences 34 also precludes the
use of the seat belt defense. This theory imposes a duty on the
plaintiff to minimize damages after the accident has occurred.
The doctrine of avoidable consequences is not applicable to the
seat belt defense because the plaintiff's alleged negligent act,
the failure to fasten the seat belt, occurred before the negligent
act of the defendant. 35 The seat belt defense simply does not
fit

into

the

doctrine

of

avoidable

consequences 36

and

most

courts are not willing to stretch the doctrine to accommodate the
seat belt defense. 37
In a negligence action, traditionally the defendant takes the
plaintiff

as

defendant's
changes

he

finds

him

negligence

this

rule

is

by

once

injury

introduced.

allowing

the

proximately
The

seat

defendant

caused

belt
to

by

defense

modify

his

liability according to whether his innocent victim was wearing a
seat belt

at the

time of the action.

Courts are reluctant to

modify this tort theory.
Another

concern

of

courts

in

considering

the

seat

belt

defense on the mitigation of damages issue is jury speculation and
conjecture.

The seat belt defense "would tend to cause rampant
. in the amount of recoverable

speculation as to the reduction
damages
belts.,,38

attributable
Juries

involved in a

to

grapple

[a]

failure

with

to

questions

use

available

similar

to

the

seat
ones

seat belt defense when they deal with proximate

cause and future damages,
[b]ut at least in such instances, the judgment deals
with what did in fact happen or what is reasonably
probable to happen. In the seat belt area, we are
dealing with what would have happened
if the
seat belt had been used as well as what happened due to
the failure to use the seat belt.39
A further problem arises when the jury determines that the
plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt did aggravate the injuries,

34Also referred to as the doctrine of mitigation of damages.
35Britton, 287 Ala. at
, 242 So. 2d at 671.
36Lipscomb, 226 A.2d at~7.
37The sole exception is New York. Westenberg, supra note
9/. at n. 13.
~8Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 396, 517 P.2d 458, 460
(1974) .
39Lipscomb, 226 A.2d at 918.
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but the jury has trouble separating the injuries caused by the
plaintiff's own negligence. 40 According to the rule of avoidable
consequences, if the jury cannot make the division, the negligence
of the plaintiff will bar all recovery.4l When the jury cannot
make an apportionment of the damages, a harsh conclusion similar
to

contributory

dismissing

negligence

the

role

of

results.

Courts

conj ecture

and

are

the

not

lightly

complexi ty

of

apportionment of damages involved in the seat belt defense. 42
Lastly, a number of courts have determined that evidence of
plaintiff's nonuse of a seat belt should not be used to mitigate
damages if the plaintiff has no statutory or common law duty to
wear

a

seat

belt. 43

These

courts

indicate

that

the

proper

vehicle for adoption of a seat belt defense based on mitigation of
damages

is

action

by

the

legislature.

"[I]t

is

apparent

that

acceptance of the seat belt defense can only be justified as a
deviation from common law negligence on a public" policy theory .
. The legislature, and not the judiciary, serves as the barometer
of public policy

. ,,44 In states where the legislature has

spoken against the seat belt defense,

the courts recognize that

the legislature has foreclosed its use. 45
Jurisdictions Recognizing the Seat Belt Defense
The jurisdictions which do not permit nonuse of an available
safety belt to be introduced as evidence in mitigation of damages
primarily focus

on the accident as a

single,

undivided unit. 46

The test used by these jurisdictions is whether the accident was
the

proximate

cause

of

the

injury.47

If

the

answer

to

this

40Id. at 917.
4lId. (Dean Prosser's analysis of the rule of avoidable
consequences) .
42See Vizzini, 72 F.R.D. at 138; Miller, 273 N.C. at 240,
l60~E.2d at 74.
43S ee , e.g., Nash, 21 Ariz. App. at
, 521 P.2d at 163-64.
44Fischer, 138 Colo. at 396, 517 P.2d at 460; see also
Miller, 273 N.C. at 238, 160 S.E.2d at 73; Roberts, 26 Ohio
App. 2d at ___ , 269 N.E.2d at 58; Fields v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla. 1976).
45S ee Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 520
(Tenn. 1973).
46In other words, these courts do not consider the effect of
a "second collision", Le., the impact which occurs when the
occupant is thrown against the interior of the motor vehicle.
This issue is of particular importance in crashworthiness
cases.
47Note, Liability for Nonuse of Child Restraints, 70 Iowa
L. Rev. 945, 951 (1985).
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question is in the affirmative, the analysis is complete and the
issue of whether the use of an available seat belt would have
mitigated the extent of the injury is never raised. 48
Jurisdictions that do recognize the seat belt defense 49 view
the accident as comprising separable stages, and consider not only
the initial collision but also the impact that occurs when the
occupant is thrown against the interior of the automobile.
leading case on the mitigation theory is Spier v.
spier,

the

court

decided

that

because

of

The

Barker. 50 In

increased

public

awareness concerning the efficacy of seat belt use in preventing
traffic injuries and fatalities, the failure of a plaintiff to use
an available seat belt could be considered unreasonable in some
circumstances. 51 The court held that nonuse of an available seat
belt

is

a

important

factor

the

limitations.

jury
First,

to the issue of damages,

may

consider 52

subject

to

two

the mitigation defense is limited

and may not be considered by the jury

with regard to the question of liability.

Second,

the defendant

has the burden of producing competent evidence which demonstrates
"a

causal

connection

between

the

plaintiff's

nonuse

available seat belt and the injuries and damages
By imposing these limitations,

of

an

sustained. ,,53

the court took into consideration

the criticism directed at the seat belt defense,

and in essence

forged a compromise with the opponents of the theory.

48Id. The use of this test would seldom, if ever result in
a finding that failure to wear an available seat belt was the
proximate cause of the injury.
49S ee Marema, The Seat Belt Defense - An Update, 28 For the
Oef. 19, 20 (1986). The following states allow evidence of
nonuse of an available seat belt to be introduced in
mitigation of damages: Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvannia,
Wisconsin, and wyoming. Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, and
Nebraska also allow mitigation, but limit the amount of
damages which may be reduced. Florida recognizes the seat
belt defense as evidence of comparative negligence, while
California has been willing to view the defense as evidence
of contributory negligence.
50 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974).
51Id. at 450, 323 N.E. 2d at 167. Although the court
indicated that failure to use an available seat belt could be
considered unreasonable depending on the circumstances of the
particular case, it was unwilling to impose seat belt use as
a standard of reasonable conduct because New York did not
have a mandatory seat belt law at that time.
52Id.
53Id.
59

The

primary

concern

would

defense

be

was

that

tantamount

adoption

to

of

the

finding

seat

the

belt

plaintiff

contributorily negligent, resulting in a directed verdict for the
defendant. If this procedure was accepted, the tort-feasor would
be relieved of liability for his wrong, contrary to the desire of
the

courts

to

do

sUbstantial

justice

to

both

parties.

This

objection is eliminated by limiting the defense to the issue of
damages only,

so that the defendant is still answerable on the

merits of the case. The second concern was the possibility that
the

question

speculation

of
by

damages
jurors,

insurmountable.

For

would
but

the

be

this

defendant

subjected
problem
merely

to
has

to

open
not

prove

ended
proven

that

the

plaintiff failed to wear an available seat belt is insufficient to
invoke the seat belt defense. The defendant must produce evidence
competent
failure

to

satisfy

to wear a

the

seatbe1 t

court's

nexus

requirement

that

the

directly caused aggravation of the

plaintiff's injuries. If the estimation of aggravated injuries is
too speculative,

the court will not allow the jury to consider

mitigation of these damages. 54 Furthermore, a calculation of the
injuries caused by nonuse can be accurately measured by accident
reconstruction experts. 55
A more

difficult

common

law

obstacle

for

the

seat

belt

defense to overcome is the doctrine of avoidable consequences.
According to this theory, a'p1aintiff is under a duty to mitigate
all damages after an accident occurs which can be avoided.

The

best

the

example

of

this

plaintiff seek medical
accident.

doctrine

is

attention as

If the plaintiff delays

the

requirement

soon as

that

possible after an

in seeking medical attention

resulting in an exacerbation of his injuries, the defendant is not
liable
however,

for

the

does

effect
not

fit

of

this

squarely

delay.
within

The
the

seat belt
perimeters

defense,
of

the

54This position is consistent with the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 465 (1965).
55S ee Annot, 80 A.L.R.3d 1033, 1041 (1977). The defendant's
attorney can readily procure the services of an expert from
an undergraduate engineering school. See also Amend v. Bell,
89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977) (seat belt defense
rejected on the grounds that it would lead to a battle of
expert witnesses) .
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doctrine of avoidable consequences. The doctrine applies only to
avoidance

of

post-accident

damages,

and

does

not

require

the

plaintiff to mitigate damages prior to the accident. Many of the
jurisdictions which have refused to adopt the seat belt defense
have done so because of a reluctance to extend the doctrine of
avoidable
damages.

consequences

to

cover

mitigation

of

pre-accident

According to these jurisdictions, the extension of the

doctrine would impose a duty on the plaintiff to anticipate the
negligence

of

principle.

This

others

in

doctrine

direct

contradiction

generally

has

not

to
been

common

law

applied

to

mitigation of pre-accident damages in the past because it has not
been

technologically

feasible

for

a

plaintiff

to

predict

or

prevent damages before an accident happens. The wide availability
of seat belts in automobiles prompted the court in Spier to extend
the doctrine to cover mitigation for nonuse.

The court reasoned

that "the seat belt affords the automobile occupant an unusual and
ordinarily unavailable means by which he or she may minimize his
or her damages prior to the accident. ,,56 Motor vehicle studies
support the court's position that traffic fatalities and injuries
are reduced by use of safety belts. 57
The Seat Belt Defense in Virginia:

Case Law

The only case in Virginia that has considered the seat belt
defense is Wilson v. Volkswagen of America,

Inc .. 58 Because this

was a case of first impression, the district court had to predict
whether the Virginia courts would adopt the seat belt defense.
The court decided that in light of existing trends in Virginia
case law,

the courts of this state should adopt the seat belt

defense. 59 The court
in spier,

that is,

imposed the

same limitations provided for

that mitigation would apply to damages only,

and must be based upon the production of competent evidence. 60
In adopting the seat belt defense, the court was faced with the

56 35 N.Y.2d at 452, 323 N.E.2d at 169.
57S ee Richmond Times Dispatch, Feb. 16, 1987, at A-II, col.
1. It is estimated that use of safety belts would eliminate
at least 100 of the 1,000 traffic fatalities in virginia each
year.
58 445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978).
59Id. at 1372.
60Id.
61

problem that Virginia law did not allow nonuse to be considered as
evidence of negligence. 6l The court stated that the prohibition
on establishing negligence from nonuse did not prevent a jury from
considering
reasoned

such

that

nonuse

had

the

in

mitigation

General

of

Assembly

damages.

The

intended

to

court

prevent

evidence of nonuse from being introduced to mitigate damages, it
explicitly would have provided for such a proscription. 62 Within
two

years

of

this

overruled wilson

by

decision,
amending

the
the

virginia

seat

belt

General
law

to

Assembly
include

a

provision that nonuse of a safety belt shall not "be considered in
mitigation

of

damages

of

whatever

nature.,,63

The

addition

of

this provision foreclosed use of the seat belt defense in civil
actions, by providing the courts with a clear indication of the
Assembly's intent that the defense be disallowed.
Conclusion
The Virginia General Assembly has taken an important first
step toward reducing the number of traffic deaths and injuries by
passing the
explicitly

new mandatory
prohibits

the

seat belt
seat

belt

law.

Although the statute

defense

in

civil

actions,

support for the law was divided and exclusion of the defense was
necessary in order to secure passage of the measure.

The seat

belt defense should be reconsidered for adoption by the Assembly
in the near future. At the present time, the defendant is liable
for

all

the

plaintiff's

injuries

in

an

automobile

accident,

including those injuries which are in the plaintiff's exclusive
power to avoid.

The equities involved in the seat belt defense

controversy are difficult to balance, and the defendant should be
liable,
which

as
the

the principle
plaintiff has

tort-feasor,
no

control.

for
with

those

injuries over

passage

of

the

new

mandatory seat belt law, the plaintiff no longer has an excuse for
failing to buckle up, and the defendant should not be held liable

61The statute at this time stated: "Failure to use such
shall not be deemed to be
safety lap belts,
negligence." Va. Code Ann. § 46.1-309.1(b) (Repl. Vol.
1974)
62 455 F. Supp. at 1373.
63va. Code Ann. § 46.l-309.l(b) (1986).

62

for the plaintiff's failure to do what is now legally required of
all Virginians.

correction: in "The Time is Ripe" discussing the need for a small
- claims court in virginia, Vol 15, #2, p. 42, a citation for Mr.
Barney's example of a landlord-tenant dispute was ommitted. That
citation is: Sandra Evans, "Small Claims Rules Confusing in
Virginia," Washington Post, 9 November 1986, p.1, col. 1.
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VIRGINIA'S DILEMMA:

PRIMARY OR CAUCUS?

James A. Kline, IV*
Stephanie Lipinski Molnar**
Adoption by the
binding

1987 Virginia General Assembly of a

Presidential

primary

for

1988

does

not

non-

resolve

which

delegate selection process, caucus or primary, best represents the
interests

of

process

of

Virginia

voters.

selection,

representation,

and

Both

fiscal

strong

party

parties

want

a

democratic

responsibility,

adequate

organization.

party nomination doors to registered voters,

By

opening

the

we can expect the

names on the party ticket to more accurately reflect the choices
of

voters

at

large.

Although

seeking

popular

consensus

in

nominating candidates seems to be the truly democratic approach to
this crucial election process,
strength endemic to

the benefit of centralized party

the mass meeting system is sometimes lost

amidst the primary.
Whichever

process

is

used,

Virginia

remains

under

the

strictures of select federal legislation, the Voting Rights Act of
1965. 1

The

Act

was

originally

imposed

upon

seven

states

and

certain counties in three other states 2 for poll practices found
to

be

discriminatory.

NOW,

an

affected

jurisdiction

cannot

permissibly "bailout" of the bonds of the act 3 until it obtains
"preclearance" from either the United states District Court for
the District of Columbia or the United states Attorney General. 4
In

the

primaries
government
years

the

past,

and
and

Republicans

caucuses
the

caucus

in

an

and

Democrats

attempt

federal

offices

system

has

to

from

been

have

control
Virginia.

criticized

used

both

the

state

In

recent

for

being

unrepresentative of virginia's electorate. Is the primary system,
given

its

checkered history,

really

better

for

Virginia?

This

* Mr. Kline is a second-year student and a member of the Moot
Court Board at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary.
** Ms. Molnar is a first-year student at the Marshall-Wythe School
of Law, College of William and Mary.
145 U.S.C. (1973a to bb(l) (1982).
2S. Rep. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1975
U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 774.
3See 42 U.S.C. {1973b (a) (1982).
4See 42 U.S.C. {1973c (1982).
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article presents arguments supporting and opposing the use of the
primary election in virginia for nominating candidates for public
office.

The virginia Primary is an asset to the Virginia electorate.
The

simplest

alternative

to

the

mass

meeting

nomination

process for political candidates is delegate selection by state
primary elections.

Results

of

the

relatively

closed convention

method often leave voters feeling stripped of the'ir right to vote
for

lack

of

participation.

A political

party

that

does

not

reflect popular sentiment or that restricts itself to maneuvering
by party "insiders" limits itself to accomplishing something less
than

the

desired

objective:

nominating

a

candidate

who

most

clearly reflects the goals and beliefs of the party and who is
most likely to implement those views by achieving success in the
general e1ection. 5
Following are

arguments

which

bolster the

use of primary

elections rather than candidate selection by mass meetings,

and

why the former are more advantageous to a democratic society.

Primaries are more open and democratic than mass meetings.
The nature of party conventions causes introvertedness of the
party,

led

by

party

activists.

The

chosen

few

control

the

direction that a party takes in selecting its nominees. Only one
percent

of

meetings. 6

the

Virginia

Excluding

99

electorate
percent

participates
of

in

the

mass

registered

Virginia's

voters 7 does not maintain an ideal democratic electoral system.
Additionally, Republicans have charged a fee to participate in the
mass

meetings, 8

a

practice

which

hauntingly

recent

adoption

resembles

the

unconstitutional poll tax. 9
The

General

Assembly's

of

the

nomination system for the 1988 Presidential race will

primary
create a

5Chambers & Rotunda, Reform of Presidential Nominating
Conventions, 56 Va. L. Rev. 179, 214 (1970).
6The Virginian-Pilot, April 22, 1985, at C4, col. 2.
7Richmond Times-Dispatch, April 18, 1985, at Section 0-2, col.
l.

8S ee supra note 6.
9S ee U.S. Const. amend. XXIV.
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party candidate selection process more accessible to rank and file
party

members,

during

while

party

associated

avoiding

conventions. 10

with

mass

practices
The

meetings

sometimes

possibility

is

shown

by

perpetrated

of

one

corruption

example

that

tarnished the road to the 1985 governorship.
The site was the Charlotte County courthouse. l1 The event
was

a

caucus

Virginia

to

state

elect

delegates

Democratic

and

alternates

Convention.

Instead

to
of

the

1985

holding

a

convention where interests were united to strengthen the party,
the meeting evolved into a divisive battle between the Davis and
Baliles camps.
The caucus was organized by a

Baliles partisan who was in

fact listed on the ballot as a Baliles candidate for delegate.
Temporary rules governing the conduct

of

the meeting were not

available at least a week in advance of the April 1, 1985 caucus,
in violation of the virginia Democratic Party Plan.

The meeting

was held in a courthouse with seating capacity of approximately
175 persons, but almost 300 attended. No access was provided for
the handicapped.
Despite the fact that the crowd would exceed capacity became
apparent about a half an hour before the 7:30 p.m. starting time,
the chair did not make an effort to secure enough certification
forms

for registering everyone until immediately prior to 7: 30.

Thus,

the

through

meeting

the

began

courthouse

late,

doors

and
that

people
were

entered

left

open

the

caucus

after

7: 30.

Undermining the requirement to have different size ballots to vote
for delegates and alternates,
were

copied

and

duplicate ballots of uniform size

distributed.

The

result

was

chaos

in

distinguishing the ballots, creating the opportunity for a skewed
tally through double balloting.
A feature of the Charlotte caucus was the racial division
that occurred during the meeting.

The chair requested that the

10See Carr & scott, The Constitutionality of State Primary
Systems: An Associational Rights Analysis, 10 J. Comtemp. L. 83
(1985) .
lISee, testimony concerning Charlotte County Grievance before the
Temporary Creditials Committee of the State Democratic Party at
the John Marshall Hotel, April 14, 1985, Richmond, Virginia.
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crowd physically divide itself into respective camps on opposite
sides

of

division.

the room,

which

resulted

in virtual

black and white

Peer pressure and public exposure directly influenced

the participants; intimidation from the chair fueled animosity.
Order and control were poorly exercised in the distribution
of the ballots to the crowd.

Numerous electors voted

than

of

the

apportioned

number

candidates

for

for more

delegates

and

alternates .12 The chair left the location with the ballots and
certification forms.
in

the

caucus

uncontrolled
delegates

There was no verification that participants

were

caucus

and

4

registered
was

the

Baliles

voters.

improper

alternates

The

result

election

of

9

of

the

Baliles

to the 1985 Virginia state

Democratic Convention.
If the mass meeting system and its heightened possibility of
misfeasance were maintained, Virginia might never see the end of a
political

structure

unresponsive

to

popular

sentiment

and

generally desired results at the polls. Such a system might never
stabilize

for

the

five

period l3

year

required

to

release

the

virginia electoral process from the proscriptions of the Voting
Rights

Act.

Enacting

the

primary

system

for

the

Presidential

nomination is a positive step towards opening the availability of
elected office to the selections of the masses,

rather than to

only the party regulars.

Party autonomy and the open primary problem of "Crossover".
A serious problem arises with the General Assembly's adoption of
the primary because virginia's primary is

"open."

Open primary

states do not require voters to register with a particular party
to exercise their right to vote. l4

This characteristic creates

the inevitable effect of "crossover," where members of party A
raid party B' s
outcome,

primary and vote in an attempt to influence the

desirably

leaving

party

A

with

an

undue

advantage

relative to party B's result. The objective is to vote for the

12see , Challenge Before the Temporary Credentials Committee of
the-r985 virginia Democratic state Convention.
13See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 332 (1966).
14See supra note 10, at 84.
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other party's underdog so that your party's first choice will face
better

odds

in

advance. IS
voters

the

Carried

general
to

participating

election

its

in

logical

another

should

both

extreme,

party's

candidates

the

primary

result
may

of

be

the

advancement of candidates other than the party's best to contend
in the general election. This leaves all voters with two second
choices

and

no

first-choice

candidate.

Pragmatically,

this

scenario is unlikely. Nonetheless, the results in an open primary
are not necessarily a

reflection of the judgment of the party

adherents .16 A party could shrink or grow unnaturally,

limiting

its ability to accomplish its political tasks. 17
virginia is no stranger to elections tainted with crossover.
In

1978,

the

Virginia

Democratic

party

abandoned

the

use

of

primaries after losing control of its nominations when populist
hopeful Henry Howell defeated Andrew P. Miller for the u.s. senate
nomination. 18 Crossover was blamed for

sparse voter turnout in

1949 and caused the Republican party to turn to mass meetings as
an alternative nominating process. 19
The

lack

of

maj or

party

membership

does

not

render

independents any less culpable with respect to crossover.

They

may register with a party in order to influence its primary,20
sometimes because of mere attraction to a particular candidate.
Loss of control by a party of its candidate selection is a
threat

to

"party

autonomy.,,21

In

an

structure and cohesiveness of a party,

attempt

to

preserve

the

constitutional arguments

based on a party's claimed right of free association have been
advanced

to

limit

a

state

legislature's

ability

primaries to party "outsiders. ,,22 Additionally,
forbidding

voting

in

primaries

by non-party

a

to

open

state statute

registrants

is an

1SSince voters are allowed to vote only once in a primary
election, participating in another party's primary results in a
trade-off in the power of a vote.
16See supra note 5, at 182.
17Id.
18See supra note 6.
19Id.
20Id.
2Tee supra note 10, at 97.
22Id. at 100.
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its

unconstitutional deprivation of

a

party's

freedom of political

association rights. 23
The

associational

rights claim was

used

in 1958 when the

United states Supreme Court recognized that an individual's right
of association under the First Amendment may be applied to a group
as

a

whole

supporting

a

when

the

common

organization

belief. 24

This

consists

of

rationale

was

individuals
expanded

to

find party autonomy for the National Democratic Party in 1975. 25
In the same year, the United states Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia closed the gap in the application of associational
rights analysis to political parties in holding that a national
party's

selection

of

protection. 26 In Ripon,
rights of speech and

nominee

a

deserves

constitutional

Chief Justice Bazelon declared that the

assembly would be meaningless without

accompanying right of political association. 27 The U.S.
Court

voiced

its

opinion

on

the

application

of

an

Supreme

associational

rights to political parties in 1981 'when it affirmed its position
in

Cousins

and

held

that

national

parties

protection from intrusion by party outsiders,
that this

rationale

have

a

right

of

and further noted

supports extending associational

rights to

state political parties "as adherents to national parties."28 In
sum, parties may freely define their membership requirements under
the

associational

rights

protection,

as

long

as

they

are

not

discriminatory.
In order to preserve party

autonomy,

some

states

enacted

statutes requiring those voters who wish to participate in the
upcoming election to register with a

particular party well

advance of the primary election. 29 However,

in

in some cases, these

23Republican Party of Connecticut v. Tashjian, 107 s. ct. 544
(1986) •
24NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
25Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
26S ee Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 548
(D.~Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1975).
27424 U.S. 567, 585 (1975).
28Democratic Party of United states v. Wisconsin ex. reI. La
Follette, 450 U.s. 107, 121 (1981), quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419
U.s. 477, 487 (1975).
29In Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), the Court found
a legitimate and valid state interest in preserving the integrity
of the electoral process by requiring voters to remain with their
registered party for eleven months before the primary election.
However, in the same year the Court struck down an Illinois
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requirements

are held to be

an excessive

restriction

on one's

right to vote. 30 The ultimate balance involves the individual's
right of freedom of association and the party's inverse right of
autonomy.

The

controlling

factor

in

the

balancing

of

the

electoral interests is whether the voter can participate in the
upcoming primaries if he acts promptly in changing his or her
party affiliation. 31
Another objection to parties'
with

the

excluded

"white
from

cases 32

primary"
the

self-protection efforts arose

nominating

where

elections.

black
In

voters

an

were

unexpected

variation from the exclusive status political parties seemed to
have acquired under the party autonomy dispute, the Supreme Court
found
that

parties

to

precludes

voters. 33

Thus

be

the

commissioned with a
denial

primaries

of
are

access
not

public

to

the

the

responsibility

polls

exclusive

to

black

province

of

integral private associational organization. 34
Although the attempt to maintain a "private" party is clearly
prohibited

by

lifeless. 35
adherence.
of

smith,

this

does

Discrimination

is

not

render

party

distinguished

automony

from

party

Therefore parties are faced with the serious dilemma

trying

to

bolster

party

membership

and

enthusiasm

while

simultaneously screening out those infiltrators who may eventually
skew

the

party's

desired

outcome.

However,

this

is

where

the

interest of the party should become subservient to the voters as
individuals and let the democractic process run its course.
Party registration is the means by which a party can most
effectively

avert

the

danger

of

crossover.

When

viewed

as

statute that barred participation in a party's primary election if
the voter had voted in another party's primary within the
preceding 23 months, calling the statute an unnecessarily
excessive restriction on one's right of free association under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments by "locking in" the voter. Kusper
v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). The Court distinguished Rosario
as not being the absolute bar from the polls that Kusper
presented. 414 U.S. at 61,62.
30Kusper, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
31See supra note 10, at 90.
32Id.
33Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
34Comment, The Constitutionality of Non-Member voting in
Political Party Primary Elections, 14 Williamette L. J. 259 at 276
(1978) .
35See supra note 10, at 92.
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encouraging
party

wide

voter

autonomy,

burdensome.

As

participation

requiring
it

voters

stands,

the

and

to

supporting

register

results

of

is

the

developed

not

1988

overly
virginia

primary will be non-binding without party registration. 36

Giving party regulars more control
meetings/conventions
does
not
make
parties stronger.
A popular argument

by using mass
the
political

supporting the use of mass meetings is

that the inherent control exercised by party activists makes the
party stronger.

Party "activists" are those individuals devoted

to serving their respective parties by donating their time and
effort to attending party caususes and serving as delegates to
conventions 37

state

and

in

recent

Virginia

history

have

nourished convention life by continuing to serve as delegates to
subsequent

meetings. 38

mass

But

given

the

presumed

experience

and established beneficial contacts party regulars acquire,

the

apparent

For

party

·cohesiveness

proves

to

be

transparent.

example, approximately 40 percent of delegates polled during the
Democratic

state

responded that

convention

they would

held

not

in

Richmond

actively

in

support

June,

the

1980,

successful

nominee if their supportee, either Edward Kennedy or Jimmy Carter,
did

not

receive

the

party's

nomination. 39

In

contrast,

an

average of 10 percent of Republican delegates polled at the GOP
convention the same month indicated noncommittal if their choice
did not succeed. 40
This

alienage

nominating
between

occured

conventions

Democratic

as

in·
well.

hopefuls

led

recent
An
to

Virginia

intraparty
accusations

gubernatorial
feud
of

in

1985

delegate

stealing, resulting in what the American Civil Liberties Union has
termed

a

"debacle"

in

state

nominating

procedure. 41

Both

the

Democratic and Republican conventions were blamed for clouding the
36washington Post, February 20, 1987, at OS, col. 4.
37Abramowitz, McGlennon & Rapoport, Presidential Activists and
the Nationalization of Party Politics in Virginia, Contemporary
Southern Attitudes and Behavior 183 (1982).
38Id. at 185.
39Id. at 190.
40Id.
41See supra note 7.
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nominating process and leaving the position of leaders and laggers
indistinguishable.
The weakness that tainted the Democratic party in 1980 was
obvious to its victim and political observers: both the Democratic
and Republican delegates considered the GOP convention to be the
most effective. 42

Primaries are not more costly than mass meetings.
Perhaps the most revealing method of analyzing the costs of
conducting conventions and primaries is the dollar-to-vote ratio
which emerges from the election results.
Consider the most

recent

local

cost of conventions which arose
race.

Collectively,

the

Republican

nominees 43

respective

party's

two

spent

controversy

out of

the

Democratic
over

candidacy. 44

$3
Be

1985

nominees
million

mindful

concerning the
gubernatorial
and

the

seeking
that

two

their

successful

candidates had yet to begin spending on the then upcoming general
election. 45 Baliles I

dollar-to-vote ratio,

an oft-quoted figure,

reached well over $400 for each delegate that his campaign sent to
the

Democratic

state

convention. 46

Davis

spent

even

more

for

fewer delegates. 47 No virginia primary has ever cost more than
what was spent by the four prospective gubernatorial nominees in
1985. 48

Opening the nominating process to Virginia voters will

surely produce a less expensive result. 49

Candidates nominated by the caucus system represent the interests
of Virginians.

42See supra note 37, at 193.
43The Democratic nominees were Lt. Gov. Richard Davis and
Attorney General Gerald Baliles. The Republican nominees were
Wyatt Durette and 8th District Rep. Stanford Parris.
~4virginian-Pilot, April 6, 1985, at A10, col. 1.
45Id.
46Id. See also supra note 7, col. 3.
47See supra note 44, col. 2.
48See supra note 6.
49virginia Senate Majority Leader Hunter B. Andrews (D.-Hamption)
estimated that the Presidential primary will cost about $1.2
million and that the legislature would appropriate about $500,000
to lessen the financial burden on locales. See supra note 36,
col. 3.
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The change from a primary candidate selection system to mass
meeting selection twice in the past is an indication that both
political
defeat

parties

in

the

realized

general

that

a

primary

election.

Reeling

is

synonymous

from

a

with

disasterous

primary that split the party, the Democrats have used the caucus
method to regroup and regain control of the governor's mansion and
five of the ten

Congressional

seats.

The Republicans have

not

nominated a candidate by any other method than the caucus since
1949,

in

a

embarassing

primary

where

only

9000

Virginians

exercised their franchise. 50
The caucus system has been defended by both parties as the
selection process that best represents the interests of the party
and

allows

present

a

democratic

selection

of

the

candidates.

They

arguments to support this position.

Caucuses are open and democratic.
Under the guidelines established by both major parties, the
selection

process

of

delegates

must

be

published

for

public

information. All feasible efforts must be made, regardless of the
selection

process,

to

allow

for

full

public

participation. 51

Full notice requires timely notice that would allow all registered
voters

to

participate

on

the

belonged to another party.

process

even

if

they

previously

The 1968 Democratic Convention Call

and subsequent calls have provided for easily accessible meeting
places at convienient times.

The Virginia Call to Convention for

1985 required that the rules for the local caucuses be published
no later than one week in advance,
process

for

Republican

contested

Party

Convention Plan. 53

has

rules

similar

and

and provided for an appeal
delegate

provisions

election. 52

incorporated

The

into

its

Both plans provide for saturday and evening

caucuses in an attempt to encourage more participation. While the
Republicans

have

charged

a

fee

to

be

a

delegate

or

50rd.
51See supra note 5, at 208.
52 Delegate Selection Plan and Call to Convention for the 1985
virginia Democratic State Convention, p. 11 [hereinafter cited as
Convention Plan].
53 See supra note 5, at 209.
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a

participant, 54

Democrats

the

a

charge

fee

delegate

for

participation only.55

Primaries create division within the party making it harder to
unite for the general election.
Primaries, with their inherent competitive element,
divisive. 56

The

sharp

division

created

between

are too

supporters

of

Henry Howell and Andrew Miller in the 1977 Primary was so severe
that the party organization could not recoup sufficiently to mount
a viable campaign against John Dalton in the general election.
The

first

ballot

commitment

requirement of

the Democratic

Party rules allows the candidates to assess their positions and
either concede early and compromise with the future victor,

or

place themselves in a position to trade delegates for concessions
to

positions

they

represented

before

the

convention,

thereby

unifying the platform and avoiding the possibility for factions.
Unlike the primary selection method that is over in one day, the
time spread for the compromise period can be several weeks.
The

candidate

in

the

convention method

is

selected by

a

majority, subject to a provisio for elimination on each ballot so
that the eventual candidate is a majority choice and reflective of
the delegates'

consensus.

It is possible in a state that doesn't

have a run-off provision to have a candidate that received only
21% of the vote to be the nominee of the party.

Giving the party regulars control of the caucus/convention
process makes the party stronger.
Making

the

party

stronger

regulars necessarily support a

does

not

mean

that

specific party leader,

the

party

but that

they support the party itself. Although the leadership reflects
the party program,

changes

in the program direction often come

from the support of the regulars. At the June 1985 Republican and
Democrat conventions in Richmond, 76% of the Democrats and 74% of
the Republicans responded that party support was a very important
54S ee supra note 6.
55Convention Plan at p. 5.
56Washington Post, April 13, 1978 at Section Va-I, col. 1.
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factor in their attendance. 57 The strength of a

party rests in

its

return

ability

to

elect

candidates.

since

the

of

the

Democrats to the Caucus system in 1981, they have won the last two
gubernatorial elections and half of the Congresiona1 seats.

The

caucus system allowed the party to regroup by providing a list of
party activists that are willing to identify themselves as members
of the party and who are willing to donate time,

influence,

and

money to get candidates e1ected. 58

The caucus system best utilizes limited financial resources.
Limited financial
role

to

Party I

S

the

resources have not played as

Republican

Party

as

they

have

in

critical a

the

Democratic

decision to change to the caucus system. The Republican

Party has always been a more effective fundraising organization
than

the

Democratic

Party. 59

Utilization

of

modern

mail

and

computer based fundraising techniques have given the Republicans a
financial edge in the past, thus relieving them of the necessity
of having
Facing a

to

save

funds

as

an excuse

limited pool of resources,

to return to primaries.

the Democrats must use the

process that requires the least expenditure.
In the Democratic Primary of 1977 for the governor I s seat,
Andrew P.

Miller and Henry Howell spent a combined $1. 5 million

do11ars. 60 This averages out to $2.84 per primary voter in 1977
dollars

compared

Ba1i1es

and Davis

to

the

average

in the 1985

$400 61

per

delegate

spent

by

Democratic Convention process. 62.

The average total is only $1.4 million, compared to $1.5 million
in the 1977 Democratic primary.63

57See supra note 37, at 183.
58we1kin, Democrat v. Democrat 102 (1984).
59ware,The Breakdown of Democratic party Organization, 19401980 251 (1985).
-OUWashington Post, March 18, 1977, at C-1, col. 6.
61see supra note 7.
62 Attorney General Gerald Ba1i1es and Lt. Gov. Richard J. Davis
were candidates for the Democratic nomination.
63Figures for the last Republican primary, held in 1949, were not
available.
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Conclusion
The use of the primary system for nominating candidates for
public office can be deferential to the desires of the virginia
electorate and possibly detrimental to party strength. Choosing a
primary over a mass meeting involves balancing competing interests
at

various

points

in

history,

hence

the

periodic

change

in

selection process in Virginia.
Because the switch back to the primary for Virginia is nonbinding,

it will not give registered voters at large a stronger

voice in the 1988 Presidential race.

The implementation of the

system achieves only half the objective of conducting a

"truly

democratic election." A caucus still will be required for actual
selection of delegates to nominate Presidential candidates.
until

the

political

virginia
party

electorate

to

avoid

is

required

crossover

will

to

Not

register with a

the

primary

work

successfully. This preventive measure safeguarding the integrity
of the primary is

a

reasonable

compromise

between maintaining

party strength and giving voters more power in the election. In
the meantime, the caucus is the determinative method of delegate
selection.
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EDUCAT·ION IN VIRGINIA:

SOLVING 'CULTURAL DIVISION

BY THE PROMOTION OF UNDERSTANDING

*J. Thompson Cravens
A black youth is struck and killed by an auto as he attempts to
cross a busy highway in an effort to escape a gang of white hoodlums
A young black cadet at a
who were attacking him and his friends. l
military academy is hazed and threatened by white cadets, wearing white
sheets and masks. Under threat, and unprotected by vasilating university officials, the cadet withdraws from school. 2 On a television news
program, high school students tell a reporter that they had never
spoken to a black "in person".
They further t-ell the reporter that
they would be "afraid" to do so.3 Ironically, the city in which these
students reside has a quite substantial black population.
At a
prestigious university, students angered by the outcome of an athletic
event seen on television attack a group of black students, leaving one
black student seriously injured. 4 Civil Rights marchers in an all
white locality are attacked and racial tensions are incensed when
demonstrators along the march route, wearing white sheets and hats,
throw rocks, bottles, and mud at marchers. 5
is slowly sliding backward, sinking once again
Our nation today
into the mire and stench of racial oppression. Americans proclaim that
no master race exists, yet these events did not occur in Pretoria, Cape
Town or Johannesburg, South Africa.
These abominable pursuits, the
acts of fear, hatred, misunderstanding, and cruelty wrought by orie man
on another, occurred here, in the United States. One can only wonder
i f those Klansmen and "white rights· protestors in Georgia were the
same drought stricken southern farmers who a few months ago needed

*Mr. Cravens is a third
of the Colonial Lawyer,
Moot Court Team. He is
movement to be titled:
Conscious of a Nation.

year law student at Marshall-Wythe, Sr. Editor
and a member of the William and Mary National
currently writing a book about the civil rights
FROM MONTGOMERY WITH A DREAM: Reawakening the

1 Howard Beach,
three year old Michael
baseball bat wielding
Shore Parkway where in
killed by an auto.
2

New York,
December 20, 1986.
Twenty
Griffith, after being beaten and chased by
youths, crawled through a fence and onto
his attempt to escape his attackers he was

The Citadel in South Carolina, Fall Semester 1986.

3 Television Interview, CBS 60 Minutes, Lansing, Michigan.
Aired Fall 1986.
4 October 1986 - University of Massachusetts at Amherst. A
fight erupted after the New York Mets won the World Series
against the Boston Red Sox.
5 Ku Klux Klan members attacked civil rights marchers in
January 1987 in Forsythe Co., Georgia.
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feed for their livestock? Were these the same farmers who thanked the
colorless heroes who grew, packed, and transported hay to their arid
fields? In an era when Americans are allegedly returning to the church
and the temple as no time since the fifties,6 this apparent rebirth of
morality has not transcended racial or cultural barriers. One wonders
what book is being studied, what morality is being taught. How ironic
that on the eve of the two-hundreth anniversary of our Constitution, we
as a people still have not come to terms with the racial and moral
issues that have plagued this nation since inception. The tragedy is
that Americans have chosen not to resolve the issues debated at
Independence Hall prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776.
When General George Washington stood on the shores of the York
River in Yorktown, Virginia in October of 1781, he watched British
ships laden with a defeated army sail into the Chesapeake Bay bound for
England.
He must have realized that it was the destiny of this great
land to bear a free and- independent people.

It was unfitting, however,

that that freedom would be restricted to certain classes of white
males.
Ironically, the first bloodshed in the struggle for American
independence was that of a black man, Crispus Attucks,7 yet his people
would remain enslaved in America for almost a century beyond the
revolution.
It would be another century after the signing of the
Emancipation Proclamation before blacks in America could exercise the
"inalienable rights" spoken of in 1776.
It is time today for someone
to say:
No, we refuse to travel down that road again. We have been
down that road - that road is darkness.
It is time that everyone
realized - socially, ethically, and morally, that people cannot be
condemned because of social status or race.
Herein lies a difficulty
for both black and white alike.
In many ways, the past we speak of is
too recent to be forgotten.
In many other instances, injustice has
never abated.
The history books of today teach our children, if at all, but a
small portion of the black struggle in America, especially during the
civil rights era. Only a few short months ago America celebrated the
birthday of one of its finest, the late Reverend Doctor Martin Luther
King, Jr.
This gesture was a glimmering ray of hope and a firm
reminder to all that things have changed. America has made inroads to
end legal segregation; but segregation in the mind and segregation in
the hear can never be ended by statute. Some have chosen to continue
practicing their prejudicial beliefs. The reason is surely ignorance.
We as a society must begin to educate, and end this misunderstanding.
Many political leaders speak of that noble movement of the 1950s
6 See Americans Return to Church and Temple:
World Report, Dec. 24, 1986!Jan. 5, 1987 at 40.

u.S. News and

7 Crispus Attucks and four other men were shot dead on
March 5, 1770 in the streets of Boston, Massachusetts.
He and
his fellow citizens were victims of what has become known as the
"Boston Masacre".
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and 1960s not as the dawn of a new day in America, but as a time of
turbulence and unrest.
That movement has far too often been recorded
in our history books and by the press as a physical reality rather than
a moral awakening.
The reason for this may lie in the fact that our
society refuses to confess wrong. We refuse to tell our children and
ourselves that our behavior and that of our parents and grandparents
before us was ethically and morally contemptable.
Events of the
present demonstrate the need to begin recording, teaching, and remembering those years as the era when America changed course and for
once made the morally correct decision. The humble ideals which forced
a poor black woman to refuse to give up her seat on a bus and created a
nonviolent revolution must be remembered today as vividly as those
ideals were lived just a few short years ago. Those dreams can sustain
us today and take us into the future. To do so, however, those words,
those dreams, must be recorded in the history books and roll from the
lips of educators.
Virginia has never been immune from racial conflict; one need only
read of the current troubles in Colonial Heights, Virginia to discern
that the civil rights issue is not dead in this state.
The pivotal
question is what can be done today to foster racial understanding and
promote harmony among people.
Virginia has always resided at the
forefront of national politics, and it is only fitting that this state
propose specific programs to aid in the struggle against racism and
prejudice.
The key to ending prejudice is both understanding and a relaxation
of tension that exists between many.
The difficult task is in determining what types of programs can be undertaken to promote cultural
understanding.
Though many avenues exist, one area of concentration
could prove the most beneficial. If we concentrate on our youth, if we
fashion the textbooks that they read and provide opportunities for
meaningful social interaction between races, classes, and cultures,
substantial progress could be achieved.
One program that could prove mutually beneficial to all is a
statewide student exchange program concentrating and operating predominantly with middle school aged children. 8 For years many school
systems have participated in exchange student programs with students
from foreign countries coming to America and American students going
abroad.
The student lives with a family and attends an area school.
It provides the student and the participating family an intensive and
realistic opportunity to interact and learn to relate with and trust
one another.
The program could be conducted at the state level
providing urban, rural, black, white, lower, middle, and upper class
Virginians the opportunity to view themselves and society from a new
and differing perspective fostering a new respect for those who live in
8 These are children generally in the 6th, 7th or 8th
grades ranging generally in age from eleven to fourteen.
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an environment different than one's own. 9
If a program such as this, so simple yet so practical, could be
begun, the initial costs would be offset by the vast potential social
gain.
The program could be conducted virtually cost-free.
School
systems could, each term, interview and select volunteer candidates for
the exchange program, and families willing to open their homes to an
exchange student could be enrolled. A student would then enter the
public school system in the area visited.
The family of the student
would provide transportation costs and normal allowance for the child.
The host family would provide, at their own expense, housing, food and
School activities in which the student participates
entertainment.
that require a fee would be paid by the students' parents. The state
could earmark special funds for administrative costs and funds for
program participants whose families cannot afford the initial transportation cost.
Though this brief description of the financial arrangement is not exhaustive, it is apparent that cost would not be a
critical factor. The student exchange could be done for an 8 or 9 week
term or for an entire semester.
The opportunities provided these
students would likely prove a rare educational experience and the
benefits to society would be lasting.
Conclusion
Our nation has arrived at a point in time where, as Doctor King
said: Rwe must either learn to live together or die of our ignorance. R
A statewide student exchange program would allow students to take a
meaningful step toward the goal of social harmony. There is something
to be said for the age old idea of Rwalking a mile in another's
moccasins R• There are those who may oppose this idea as unnecessary or
unwarranted.
One may only ask, however, is deeper understanding ever
unwarranted?
If man has the ability to send rockets into space and
communicate via satellite with the far reaches of our world, should we
not allow our children the opportunity to interact and develop ties
with those in their own state from different socioeconomic backgrounds?
It is time to step forward and be counted.
The struggle
today is not so much equality or voting rights as it is understanding
and empathy. This program could provide our state and the nation with
a new generation of Virginians who comprehend the vast cultural
divergence existing within the state/nation and will seek to utilize
those differences to create a more positive society rather than
excluding from their world those different from themselves whose
lifestyles and ideas are not familiar to them.
9 Students from Rural areas would be sent to Urban areas,
urban students to rural school systems. Black students would be
sent to predominantly white school systems and white students to
predominantly black school systems.
The attempt would be to
place the student in an environment dissimilar to his/her own:
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